SPORT AS SPEECH
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“Whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had better learn
baseball . . . .”
Jacques Barzun

1

INTRODUCTION
Americans love sports. We love to play sports, we love to talk
about sports, but mostly we love to watch them. While only roughly
sixteen percent of people in the United States age fifteen and older
2
play sports and exercise on a regular basis, a recent poll found that
3
over half of all Americans regularly watch football on television. In
2005, over seventy-four million people attended a Major League
4
Baseball game. In 2011, over 111 million people watched the television broadcast of the Super Bowl—making it the most watched
5
network event in twenty years. Super Bowl viewership in 2012 was
6
higher still. The tremendous popularity that spectator sports enjoy
in the United States is a consequence of the pleasure and meaning
that viewers find in the activity. Watching games offers audiences an
excitement that may be otherwise missing from daily life in a com*
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plex, industrialized society. They also provide important symbols of
national identity. As President Bill Clinton noted in 1988, “America,
rightly or wrongly, is a sports crazy country . . . and we often see
8
games as a metaphor or a symbol of what we are as a people.” For
individuals, supporting the home team can provide a powerful means
9
of expressing and forging membership in the community. For many,
it may also be a deeply emotional experience.
Nevertheless, despite extensive evidence of the personal, cultural,
even political significance that the act of watching sports can possess,
courts have largely rejected the possibility that spectator sports are
expressive acts and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.
10
Few commentators have disagreed. This is despite the fact that, over
the past several decades, courts have recognized an increasing array
of expressive conduct to fall within the protection of the First
7
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NORBERT ELIAS & ERIC DUNNING, QUEST FOR EXCITEMENT: SPORT AND LEISURE IN THE
CIVILIZING PROCESS (1988) (asserting that sports provide a “mimetic excitement” otherwise missing from life in industrialized society).
Kathryn Jay, MORE THAN JUST A GAME: SPORTS IN AMERICAN LIFE SINCE 1945, at 2 (2004).
(internal quotation marks omitted).
See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
In a 2004 article, Howard Wasserman argued that “sport carries political and social messages” and “is a proper vehicle through which a message or meaning may be presented
and expressed.” Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 367, 374–76 (2004). Wasserman is alone among legal academics in suggesting that all
spectator sports deserve categorical First Amendment protection. Other scholars have
reached a similar conclusion with respect to particular spectator sports. Charles I.
Schachter, Selfridge v. Carey: The First Amendment’s Applicability to Sporting Events, 46 ALB.
L. REV. 937, 977–78 (1982) (arguing that a particular rugby match satisfied the test for
expressive conduct and deserved constitutional protection); Joshua A. Stein, Hitting Below
the Belt: Florida’s Taxation of Pay-Per-View Boxing Programming is a Content-Based Violation of
the First Amendment, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 999, 1002 (2006) (“Boxing deserves the First Amendment protections that have been granted to other physical, yet expressive, conduct.”).
Others have reached the opposite conclusion. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to
Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2057 (2004) (asserting that
the “free speech claims” of spectator sports like boxing and hockey “are tenuous”); Michael T. Morley, “Exceedingly Vexed and Difficult”: Games and the First Amendment, 112 YALE
L.J. 361, 368 (2002) (“It seems that athletes in only a few sports, such as diving, gymnastics, and figure skating, are sufficiently close to being theatrical performers or dancers to
merit constitutional protection.”). For the most part, however, legal academics have
simply ignored the question of the First Amendment status of sports themselves. The
bulk of the legal scholarship exploring First Amendment issues as they relate to sports has
instead tended to focus on the constitutional status of activities associated with the playing, watching, and business of sports rather than the games themselves. See, e.g., Louis M.
Benedict & John D. McMillen, Free Expression Versus Prohibited Speech: The First Amendment
and College Student Sports Fans, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 5 (2005) (examining the First
Amendment rights of student sports fans); Christopher J. Kaufman, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: 15-Yard Penalty and Loss of Free Speech in Public University Sports Stadiums, 57 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1235 (2009) (examining the First Amendment rights of expression of spectators at
university sporting events).
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Amendment. Today, nude dancing, begging, and making a movie or
violent video game are all activities that trigger First Amendment
11
scrutiny. Yet, playing football or baseball, or performing an artistic,
non-team sport like gymnastics or figure skating, is not. This means
that watching sports, at least in person, is also not granted First
Amendment protection, because audience rights typically derive
12
from and depend upon the rights of performers.
This Article argues that the denial of free speech protection to
spectator sports—that is, to sport performed in front of and with the
intention of being seen by an audience—is wrong, both doctrinally
and when considered in light of the aims and purposes of the First
Amendment. Doctrinally, it is wrong because games of spectator
sports express, and effectively communicate, the “particularized
messages” that the Supreme Court has held to be the prerequisite for
13
constitutional protection.
Philosophically, it is wrong because
spectator sports contribute to the democratic public sphere in much
the same way as do the other genres of mass entertainment that the
First Amendment protects. Like movies and other kinds of artistic
entertainment, spectator sports not only entertain, they also help
shape public attitudes and beliefs by providing audiences dramatic
images of triumph and defeat, of virtue and excellence. In this
respect, sports demonstrate the tremendous influence that even
lowbrow and highly commercialized genres of mass entertainment
can have on democratic public attitudes and commitments. The
same justifications that led the Court to recognize movies and other
forms of artistic entertainment as protected by the First Amendment
thus apply also to spectator sports, despite the formal differences that
distinguish artistic and athletic performances. For this reason, the
11
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Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“[V]ideo games qualify for
First Amendment protection.”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991)
(“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that begging is expressive conduct because, although beggars do not
transmit or express social or political messages, their presence, appearance, and conduct
express their need for help).
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them[.]”).
See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into
play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.’” (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)).
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government should not be able to ban the performance of spectator
sports, or the training such performance requires, because it dislikes
the messages that the sport conveys. While the popularity of sports
like football and baseball works, as a kind of prophylactic against
censorhip, the same is not true of all sports. Less widely popular
sports, such as boxing and mixed martial arts, remain vulnerable to
efforts to prohibit their performance because of distaste for the violent and hyper-masculine messages they send. This offends, or
should be recognized to offend, the First Amendment as much as
similar efforts to censor artistic or political performance do.
What follows thus makes the case for recognizing spectator sports
as expressive conduct, worthy of First Amendment protection. Part I
examines the exceptional status of spectator sports in First
Amendment doctrine and the justifications that courts provide to
explain them. It argues that none of the justifications provide a
satisfactory reason for denying spectator sports the First Amendment
protection afforded all other genres of what we might call “audienceoriented entertainment.”
Part II examines what the social scientific literature on sports
reveals about the expressiveness of athletic performance. The case
law dealing with the First Amendment status of sport has tended to
ignore the extensive body of social scientific research examining the
practice, and the cultural significance, of spectator sports in
contemporary society. This is problematic because it leaves courts at
the mercy of their pretheoretical assumptions about the value and
significance of spectator sports—assumptions that the scholarly
literature suggests are simply wrong. Indeed, when we turn to the
social scientific literature, what we find is tremendous evidence that,
rather than the relatively meaningless acts of entertainment that the
case law makes them out to be, games of spectator sports are in fact
dense symbolic performances—performances that communicate
messages about, among other things, individual excellence and
virtue, political identity, race, gender, sexuality, and even beauty. It
is because of the ability of spectator sports to communicate these
kinds of messages to their audiences that they possesses the cultural
and political significance that they do, not only in the United States,
but around the world.
Part III argues that the rich evidence of sports’ expressiveness
means that neither doctrine nor philosophy justifies denying First
Amendment protection to spectator sports while extending it to
other genres of mass entertainment such as movies, plays, and dance
performances. It argues that, in fact, there are no justifications for
denying First Amendment protection to spectator sports. Instead,
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the denial of First Amendment protection to spectator sports only
needlessly complicates the doctrine, by establishing an ultimately
unjustifiable distinction between artistic and athletic expression and
between live and televised athletic performance.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH SPORTS
In his now-famous paean to the glories of baseball in Flood v.
Kuhn, Justice Blackmun quoted a poem that had been published in
the New York Herald Tribune in 1926. The poem commented
pungently on the relative importance of sports and literature in
American popular culture at the time. It noted that
Ten million never heard of Keats, or Shelley, Burns or Poe;
But they know “the air was shattered by the force of Casey’s blow”;
They never heard of Shakespeare, nor of Dickens, like as not,
14
But they know the somber drama from old Mudville’s haunted lot.

Eighty-five years later, the subtext of that poem—that sports play a
far more vital role in American popular culture than does poetry or
art—remains as true as when it was written. It is sports, not art (or, as
the poem suggests, when it is art, it is art about sports), that for many
Americans provide the tragic and/or comedic narrative of their
collective existence. Americans spend hours every week watching
sports on television; and for many, the sports pages are the first,
perhaps only, section of the newspaper they read. Sports metaphors
pervade the American dialect; sports imagery pervades the American
marketplace; and sports news and narratives pervade the American
15
media. Sports thus provide many in the United States, as the sports
historian Kathryn Jay notes, with a “central lens through which we
16
view the world[.]”
Despite the importance of sports as a cultural institution—and
despite Justice Blackmun’s explicit acknowledgement of this
importance (at least with respect to baseball)—few courts have even
hinted at the possibility that the act of participating in athletic
competition might be a protected First Amendment activity. Most
instead conclude that sports games, even when performed in front of
and with the intention of being seen by an audience, are not capable

14
15

16

Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 263 n.4 (1972) (quoting Grantland Rice, He Never Heard of
Casey, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 1, 1926, at 23).
DANIEL L. WANN, ET AL. SPORTS FANS: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
SPECTATORS 2, 13–17 (2001) (discussing the pervasiveness of sports as demonstrated
through various media sources, including cinema, television, radio, print, and Internet).
JAY, supra note 8.
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of conveying the kinds of “particularized message[s]” that the
Supreme Court, in Spence v. Washington, held that nonlinguistic
conduct must communicate in order to receive First Amendment
17
protection. Courts find this to be true notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s subsequent clarification in Hurley v. Irish-American, Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group that messages need not be “succinctly
articulable” in order to merit First Amendment protection and,
therefore, even such amorphous messages as those conveyed by the
abstract “painting[s] of Jackson Pollock, . . . or Jabberwocky verse of
18
Lewis Carroll” are “unquestionably shielded.” Even under this more
relaxed articulation of the particularized message requirement,
courts tend to reject First Amendment claims arising out of athletic
performance either because they find that games do not reflect the
requisite “intent to express a particularized message” that the first
19
part of the Spence test for expressive conduct requires, or because
they find that even when athletes do possess the requisite intent, the
medium of the sports game is unable to communicate this message in
20
a form in which the audience is likely to understand it.
What this means is that art and sport enjoy a very different status
under the contemporary First Amendment. Whereas art, including
the nonpolitical abstract art and music referred to in Hurley, is generally considered high-value speech and therefore receives the same
degree of protection as the expressly political speech that has historically been the primary concern of free speech jurisprudence, sports—
even spectator sports—usually receives no First Amendment protection whatsoever. Although several courts have suggested that, under
the right circumstances, the “exposition of an athletic exercise” might

17
18
19

20

418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 374 (D. Ariz. 1983) (dismissing the First
Amendment claim of college football players on the ground that college football, “like
other sports, is primarily a conduct-oriented” rather than a “communicative” activity);
Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1096 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (dismissing the
First Amendment claim of a wrestling promoter on the grounds that “[t]he promotion of
wrestling matches . . . is not a symbolic act, nor is the wrestling match itself a symbolic act”
but instead constitutes a “purely entertainment pastime”).
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D.
Mo. 2002) (denying First Amendment protection to video games because, like baseball
games, they fail to express any “ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to
the game itself”); Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(dismissing the First Amendment claim of amateur police boxers because “[w]hile we
recognize that dance, when combined with nudity, can inexorably convey a message of
eroticism . . . . we are not convinced that a boxing match, in which police officers participate, inexorably conveys any message other than that police officers can be pugilists”).
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be entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection, in only
two cases have courts actually struck down regulations of athletic
competition on First Amendment grounds, and in neither case did
22
the court squarely hold that sport was protected expression.
From a purely institutional perspective, this distinction between
spectator sports and art is puzzling. Like plays, concerts, ballets, and
movies, spectator sports provide what we can call “audience-oriented
entertainment.” A football game, like a rock concert or art show, is
an event that is performed in order to entertain and amuse an audience and that, in the absence of an audience, would not exist—or at
least, would only exist in radically altered form. (Think of the Super
Bowl, for example, with nobody watching.) Economically, as well, the
spectator sports industry depends upon the willingness of spectators
to watch its performances, just as the motion picture industry depends upon the willingness of the public to buy tickets to shows.

21

22

Post Newsweek Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, 86 (D. Conn.
1981) (asserting that the broadcast of a skating competition is protected speech, albeit
“on the periphery of” First Amendment protection). See also Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 205, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying First Amendment protection to the private,
at home, practice of martial arts but recognizing that because the martial arts are historically and culturally significant to many, there could be circumstances in which an individual’s practice of martial arts would merit First Amendment protection); Sunset
Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of L.A., 496 P.2d 840, 845–46 (Cal. 1972)
(“[N]o case has ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls within the ambit
of the First Amendment, at least in the absence of some element of communicating or advancing
ideas or beliefs.” (emphasis added)).
In the first case, the court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of a village ordinance that made it unlawful “to play any games upon any
street, alley, or sidewalk, or other public places except when a block party permit has
been issued by the President and the Board of Trustees” because, inter alia, it found the
statute overbroad in prohibiting even games performed with an expressly political intent.
Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736–37 (N.D. Ill. 2000). In the second case, a Maine district court held that a city parade regulation that exempted all
“athletic events conducted by the Board of Education, Little League or other organizations” from the arduous registration requirements otherwise imposed on large-scale gatherings violated the First Amendment not by discriminating against certain kinds of speakers on the basis of the content of their speech, but by placing burdensome restrictions on
particular indigent groups while allowing other favored groups more freedom. Sullivan v.
City of Augusta, 406 F. Supp. 2d 92, 107–08, 114, 126 (D. Me. 2005), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, rev'd in part, 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007). The court acknowledged that other
courts “have hesitated to declare that restraints on athletic activity violate the First
Amendment” but concluded that, even if “pure athletic activities and games may not be
protected by the First Amendment, free speech activities are quite foreseeable at the
broader category of an athletic event.” Id. at 107–08 n.13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court struck down the regulation, in other words, because of its
discriminatory effect on the expressive rights of those who attended athletic and nonathletic events, rather than because it found the athletic events themselves to be expressive acts.
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The explicit orientation of spectator sports toward an audience establishes a strong presumption that something expressive is taking
place. After all, why else would individuals address an audience if
they did not wish to thereby communicate a message of some sort?
And why would the audience pay good money to watch them if they
received no messages from the act?
In other contexts, courts have suggested that the presence of an
audience orientation in fact establishes not only a presumption that
something expressive is taking place but also may be dispositive of the
23
expressiveness question altogether. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, for example, the Supreme Court extended protection to nude dancing despite having denied protection only two years earlier, in City of Dallas
24
v. Stanglin, to recreational ballroom dancers. In his concurrence in
Barnes, Justice Souter reconciled the two decisions by pointing to the
presence, in the first case, and the absence, in the second case, of an
audience-orientation. Souter argued,
Not all dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection as expressive
activity. This Court has previously categorized ballroom dancing as beyond the Amendment’s protection . . . and dancing as aerobic exercise
would likewise be outside the First Amendment’s concern. But dancing
as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience gives expression
at least to generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude
or nearly so the feeling expressed, in the absence of some contrary clue,
25
is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic experience.

Two decades earlier, the California Supreme Court similarly suggested that the presence or absence of an audience-performer relationship could be decisive in distinguishing protected from unprotected conduct when it rejected a First Amendment challenge
brought by owners of a Los Angeles roller skating rink to a city agency’s decision denying them a permit to continue operating the rink
26
the following year. The plaintiffs claimed that the decision violated
27
the free speech and assembly rights of their patrons. The court disagreed because it found no evidence that those who skated at the
rink intended their skating to be seen by others:
[N]o case has ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls
within the ambit of the First Amendment, at least in the absence of some
element of communicating or advancing ideas or beliefs . . . . The key element is, of course, communication. We have difficulty finding that essen-

23

24
25
26
27

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
Sunset Amusement, 496 P.2d at 843–44.
Id. at 845.
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tial element to exist in the context of a roller skating rink. True, it is inevitable that some patrons of the rink watch the other skaters and are,
perhaps, entertained or amused by their activities. And yet it seems inescapable that petitioners’ patrons primarily use the facilities for physical
exercise and personal pleasure; [the] element of communication be28
tween an artist or performer and his audience seems entirely lacking.

Although not stated as explicitly elsewhere, the idea that it is the
presence of an audience-performer relationship that distinguishes
expressive conduct from that which is not expressive informs, and
helps make sense of, much of the First Amendment case law dealing
with art and entertainment. This idea explains, for example, why—
when confronted with an activity involving an audience-performer relationship—courts tend to extend First Amendment protection without requiring first any proof that the conduct actually satisfies both
29
elements of the Spence test for expressive conduct. This is notwithstanding the general recognition that, in theory, the Spence principles
apply to art and entertainment, as to other forms of non-linguistic
30
expression. The audience-orientation appears to obviate any need
to demonstrate that the actor, dancer, or musician actually intended
to convey a particularized message to the audience, or that this message was, in the circumstances in which it was expressed, likely to be
understood.
Courts’ willingness to extend First Amendment protection to all
activities that involve a recognizable performer-audience relationship
means that today, the category of spectator sports is the only genre of
audience-oriented entertainment that is not categorically protected
by the First Amendment. There are a number of other popular genres of entertainment that are also denied First Amendment protec-

28
29

30

Id. at 845–46.
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (extending categorical
First Amendment protection to musical performance without invoking the Spence test);
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975) (recognizing live theatre as
protected speech without requiring any evidence that actors intended to convey particularized messages or that these messages were likely to be understood, as required by the
Spence test); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1477 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“Films, plays, and even ‘crude street skits’ constitute inherently expressive communicative vehicles and, as such, warrant First Amendment protection even if the speaker cannot
establish an intent to convey a particularized message.”). See also Amy Adler, Girls! Girls!
Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.19 (2005)
(noting that, when deciding whether nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court “[o]ddly” did not invoke the Spence test in either Barnes or a
subsequent case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)).
Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (interpreting the “particularized message” requirement in Spence as not requiring linquistic
expression in light of the extension of First Amendment protection to art).
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tion. Gambling, for example, is generally not considered expressive
31
32
activity. Nor is recreational dancing, as Stanglin made clear. However, these activities typically do not involve the kind of audienceperformer relationship that characterizes movies and musical performances, and all of the other kinds of art and entertainment that
the First Amendment protects. Spectator sports do involve an audience-performer relationship, but nevertheless are generally denied
any recognition as expressive activity. This makes its status under the
First Amendment an exceptional one. As such, it raises as an obvious
question, namely, what it is about spectator sports that make them—
or that makes courts perceive them to be—inexpressive in a way that
all other genres of audience-oriented entertainment are not.
The sports case law provides little assistance in answering this
question. Courts provide generally three explanations for the denial
of First Amendment protection to spectator sports, but none provide
an ultimately convincing explanation of the distinction between
sports and art.
Some courts argue that games of spectator sports are not expressive acts because those who take part in them do not do so in order to
communicate any ideas or information to their audiences. A Florida
district court made this argument to justify its dismissal of a wrestling
promoter’s First Amendment challenge to a city lease agreement that
granted his competitor exclusive access to the only facility in town
33
capable of hosting public wrestling matches. The promoter argued
that the lease agreement violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from expressing himself through the promotion of the
34
wrestling matches. The court disagreed because it found no evidence that the promoter intended to use the matches as a vehicle for
advancing his own political or social views, or for allowing the wres35
tlers to advance their own. The court pointed to a colloquy between
the plaintiff and defense counsel in which the plaintiff admitted that
31

32

33

34

35

See, e.g., Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454–55 (D.R.I. 1985) aff'd,
788 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that playing and conducting Bingo games is a form of expression and association that is protected by the First
Amendment); United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (“The First
Amendment is not applicable where criminal conduct is involved.”).
See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25 (“The Dallas ordinance restricts attendance at Class E dance
halls. . . . These opportunities . . . simply do not involve the sort of expressive association
that the First Amendment has been held to protect.”)
Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1094–95 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (emphasizing that wrestlers do not participate in wrestling matches for the purpose of publibly expressing political statements or philosophies or addressing the public through speeches).
Id. at 1096.
Id.
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he did not intend to make his wrestlers “stop wrestling and make
speeches to the crowd” and concluded that
There can be no serious contention, and none has been advanced by
plaintiff, that . . . wrestling is an activity “akin to free speech” as that
phrase was used in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District . . . . [to
refer to] the symbolic act of wearing politically significant armbands to
protest the Vietnam war . . . . This case does not involve a speech by a
public figure or anything of that nature, but only concerns the right to
promote wrestling, a purely entertainment pastime. There is no evidence which could conceivably support the idea that the promotion of
professional wrestling involves speech or symbolic acts equivalent to
36
speech . . . .

The court concluded, in other words, that wrestling constituted a
“purely entertainment pastime,” rather than “speech or symbolic
acts,” because it was not intended to convey political messages like
those the schoolchildren in Tinker intended to convey by wearing
black armbands to school. In 1982, a New York district court similarly
concluded that baseball games do not deserve First Amendment protection because they provide “pure entertainment with no informa37
tional element.”
Other courts argue that there is something inherent in the nature
of athletic performance that distinguishes sport from art. A New York
district court, for example, accepted, for purposes of argument, that
members of an amateur police boxing team took part in public boxing matches because they wanted to convey the “particularized message” that they were “individuals of character pursuing excellence
and adhering to ethical standards of fair play and sportsman38
ship . . . .”
It nevertheless concluded that whatever messages the
boxers intended to convey via their performance in the ring would
not be likely be understood by their audiences. “While we recognize
that dance, when combined with nudity, can inexorably convey a
message of eroticism,” the court wrote, “we are not convinced that a
boxing match, in which police officers participate, inexorably conveys
39
any message other than that police officers can be pugilists.” An Arizona district court made a similar distinction between sport and art
when it called college football a “conduct-oriented activity” and on
this basis distinguished it from the more “communicative” genres of
artistic performance, such as jazz music and nude dance, which were
36
37
38
39

Id. at 1095–96.
America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep’t of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp.
170, 174 (E.D.N.Y 1982).
Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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40

entitled to First Amendment protection. The court did not explain
what it is about college football that makes it, unlike jazz music or
nude dancing, insufficiently communicative to justify First Amendment protection. One could speculate, however, that it has something to do with the violence and physicality of the sport when compared to the more obviously aesthetic orientation of music and
41
dance. Alternatively, it may have something to do with the fact that
football is a competitive activity, whereas jazz music and dance are
not.
This distinction is what underpins the third, and perhaps most
persuasive, justification courts provide for denying First Amendment
protection to sport: namely, that because sport typically involves
competition, it is incapable of expressing the kinds of messages that
the First Amendment protects. A Missouri district court made this
argument, for example, in Interactive Digital Software Association v. St.
Louis County, to explain why neither baseball nor baseball video
games are entitled to First Amendment protection. The court wrote
[T]he game of baseball is not a form of expression entitled to free
speech protection. It is often times surrounded by speech and expressive
ideas—music between innings, fans carrying signs with expressive messages—however, these expressive elements do not transform the game of
baseball into “speech.” Rather it remains, just what it is—a game. Nor
does the Court think there is some magical transformation when this
game of baseball appears in video form. The objectives are still the
same—to score runs—and the only difference is a player pushes a button
or swings a “computer bat,” rather than swinging a wooden
bat . . . . [T]he Court fails to see how video games express ideas, impres42
sions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself.

The court suggests here that it is because those who play baseball
do so with the objective of winning the game—rather than for some
other, presumably more expressive reason—they fail to communicate
by their performance in the game any messages, or at least any messages that the First Amendment protects, even when the performance
itself is surrounded by other kinds of expressive activity (fans waving
signs, music before and in the middle of the game, etc.).

40
41

42

Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 374 (D. Ariz. 1983).
Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that while First Amendment protection
should be denied to sports such as football and wrestling, it should be extended to other
sports—ice skating, gymnastics, diving—which more closely resemble music and dance
and in which athletes’ participation is guided by more self-evidently aesthetic concerns.
Morley, supra note 10, at 368.
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. Mo.
2002).
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In a 2002 article in the Yale Law Journal, Michael T. Morley similarly argued that the fact that they involve competition means that
most sports do not deserve First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the “inconsisten[cy]” created by “deny[ing] constitutional
protection to sporting events, while extending it to other forms of live
43
entertainment performed before audiences.” The fact that sport involves competition, Morley argued, means that “unlike most theatrical performances, just about everything an athlete does can be explained by something other than an attempt to convey an idea to the
44
audience.” It also means that, when athletes participate in spectator
sports, their performance is primarily guided by “functional, non45
expressive concerns such as catching a pass or kicking a goal.” For
this reason, he concluded that the only spectator sports that deserve
First Amendment protection are those in which the competition itself
depends upon the ability of the athletes to effectively express messages of grace and beauty through their performance. In these sports
only, Morley suggests, the fact of competition will not blur or under46
mine the expressive desires that athletes may bring to the sport.
None of these arguments provide a persuasive explanation for
why art is entitled to First Amendment protection but spectator sport
is not. The first idea—that spectator sports are not expressive acts
because they function to entertain rather than to educate or politicize—is deeply unsatisfying as a justification for denying free speech
protection to spectator sports, given the extension of First Amendment protection to other genres of expression—movies, music,
dance, even video games—that similarly function primarily to entertain. Indeed, the First Amendment protects more than merely the
“exposition of ideas,” as the Supreme Court noted over fifty years
ago, in Winters v. New York, when it struck down the conviction of a
bookseller convicted of selling magazines “principally made up
of . . . stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime” and disavowed any
attempt to distinguish between protected and unprotected expres47
sion on the basis of whether it educates or merely entertains. “The
line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive,” the
Court stated, “for the protection of that basic right [of a free press].
43
44
45
46

47

Morley, supra note 10, at 367.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id. (suggesting that athletes in sports such as ice skating, gymnastics, and diving are entitled to protection under the First Amendment because these sports are “permeate[d]”
with creative, artistic expression rather than being “primarily controlled by functional,
nonexpressive concerns”).
333 U.S. 507, 508, 510 (1948).
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Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.
48
What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.” Because it recognized that even non-political and non-didactic expression can have a political effect on its audience’s beliefs and opinions,
the Court refused to sustain the prosecution of even vulgar literature
like the true crime magazines and, in subsequent decades, extended
First Amendment protection to many other kinds of merely enter49
taining speech. It cannot, therefore, simply be the fact that athletes
do not communicate in speeches, or seek by their performance to
advance a particular set of social or political ideas that precludes First
Amendment protection because the same would obviously be true of
many varieties of non-political art and entertainment that the Court,
in the decades since Winters, has recognized to be “unquestionably”
50
protected by the First Amendment.
The second idea—that there is something inherent in athletic activity that renders it inexpressive—is also unpersuasive as a justification for the denial of First Amendment protection to sport. Under
Spence, it is not the form of the activity but instead the context in
which it takes place and the intent with which it is performed that determines its status under the First Amendment. Hence, activities that
share many of the same formal properties may possess a very different
constitutional status. For example, recreational ballroom dancing
and nude dancing share many of the same formal properties. Nevertheless, only nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection
51
because—as Justice Daniel Souter noted in his Barnes concurrence —
it is only nude dancing that is addressed to, and performed in front
of, an audience. Without more elaboration of what it is about the
context in which, or the intent with which, boxing matches—or football games—are performed, this justification for denying those who
participate in these games First Amendment protection is deeply unsatisfying.
Nor can the distinction between art and sport be justified on the
basis of their purportedly aesthetic versus non-aesthetic orientations.
48
49
50

51

Id. at 510.
See supra note 29.
Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(“[I]f confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ . . . [constitutional
protection] would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” (internal citation
omitted)); see Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170,
188 (2012) (noting that art receives First Amendment protection notwithstanding the absence, in many cases, of any intent by the artist to communicate ideas).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
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For one thing, it is not at all clear that athletes, even in non-aesthetic
sports such as boxing and baseball, do not seek by their performance
in the ring or on the field to communicate messages of grace and
52
beauty. Even assuming for purposes of argument that they do not,
there is nothing in the case law that suggests that messages of beauty
are the only kinds of messages to which constitutional protection extends. To the contrary, it is a fundamental principle of the First
Amendment that, except with respect to a few limited categories of
speech, the guarantee of freedom of expression applies equally to all
53
speakers, irrespective of the content of their speech. The fact that
athletes and others associated with spectator sports may not intentionally communicate by their performance on the field the kinds of
aesthetic messages that dancers or musicians communicate does not
justify denying them First Amendment protection if they communicate other kinds of messages (as I argue in the next Part that they
do).
The third idea, that spectator sports are not entitled to First
Amendment protection because they involve competitive activity is
also not ultimately persuasive as an explanation of the difference in
the constitutional status afforded sport and art. Intuitively, the argument has a great deal of appeal. It identifies what appears to be a
fundamentally distinguishing feature of sport and the artistic genres
of entertainment that the First Amendment protects. Art does not,
after all, tend to be organized as a competition, whereas sport is by
54
definition competitive. This fact in turn has important implications
52
53

54

See infra notes 76–78 (demonstrating examples of purposes that some athletes may have
and messages that they may seek to communicate through their athletic performances).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’”) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 818 (2000) (“[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the
individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”).
There is some debate about how to define sport and, specifically, whether the term refers
to all “competitive, rule-governed activity that human beings freely choose to engage
[in],” or only to competitive activities that require physical exertion on the part of the
competitors. Compare CRAIG CLIFFORD & RANDOLPH FEEZELL, COACHING FOR CHARACTER:
RECLAIMING THE PRINCIPLES OF SPORTSMANSHIP, 11 (1997) with JAY COAKLEY, SPORTS IN
SOCIETY 21 (2006) (defining sports as “institutionalized competitive activities that involve
rigorous physical exertion or the use of relatively complex physical skills by participants
motivated by internal and external rewards.”). What neither side of the debate disputes,
however, is that sport involves competition. Cf. Sport Definition MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sport (last visited Feb. 28,
2014) (defining sport as “a contest or game in which people do certain physical activities
according to a specific set of rules and compete against each other”).
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for how the different kinds of performances operate. A football
game will be structured very differently than a ballet performance, for
example, and this is not simply because in one performance the performers dance and in another performance they hit one another and
run and catch balls. Instead, it is because, in one performance, the
dynamism of the performance derives from the competitive struggle
of the players to win, and in the other it does not. We experience the
two performances differently, as a result. We might call a really exciting football game a nail-biter, for example, but we would never describe an exciting ballet in this way. This is because we watch the
football game in order to see who wins the competition, whereas this
is not why we watch a ballet, nor a reason to give it praise.
The fact that sport involves competition and art typically does not
thus helps explain many of the formal differences between sport and
art as genres of performance. It also may affect our judgment about
55
the relative cultural value that the two genres of activity possess.
What that fact does not do, however, is justify the legal conclusion
that courts draw from it: namely, that sport, and other competitive
activities, are not entitled to First Amendment protection even when
performed before, and addressed to, an audience. This is because,
under Spence, the form that an activity takes is irrelevant to the question of whether the First Amendment applies.
Instead, the only question that matters constitutionally is whether
games of spectator sports convey particularized messages that audiences can understand. This is an empirical question, but one courts
have not turned to the empirical, or even the popular, writing on
sports to address. This is problematic, because when we do turn to
the relatively extensive body of social scientific literature on sports,
what becomes clear is that the empirical assumptions that underpin
the courts rely on are wrong. It is simply not the case that, because
55

The philosopher Graham Gordon argues, for example, that one of the implications of
the formal differences between sport and art is that, while there may be “sporting equivalents” of great artistic performers, such as the opera singer Maria Callas and the actor,
Lawrence Olivier—he suggests, as equivalents for these figures, the tennis player, Martina
Navratilova, and the boxer, Muhammed Ali, respectively—there will be “no sporting
equivalents of Shakespeare and Mozart.” GORDON GRAHAM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARTS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO AESTHETICS 27–28 (2005). This leads him to conclude that, while
sport may be a tremendously important and creative human endeavor, it is nevertheless
of lesser cultural significance than the arts. Id. at 28. Other philosophers, however, disagree. For a strong articulation of an opposing point of view, see Peter J. Arnold, Sport, the
Aesthetic and Art: Further Thoughts, 38 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUDIES 160 (1990) (arguing that
some sports have aesthetic significance and merit and that all sports can usually be classified as either non-aesthetic or partially aesthetic while some sports may be correctly classified as art).
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athletes play games in order to win them, they neither intend nor are
capable of communicating, by their performance in the game, any
messages worth protecting. To the contrary, as the social scientific
literature on sports demonstrates, it is in many respects because sport
involves competition that games possess the important cultural, even
sometimes political, significance that they do—as the next Part explores.
II: SPORT AS AN EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY
Under Spence, two things must be true for games of spectator
sports to merit the protection of the First Amendment. First, individuals associated with the performance of the game—be they athletes, coaches, promoters, funders, or the like—must seek to convey,
by their participation in the event, particularized, even if not suc56
cinctly articulable, messages. Second, the messages that athletes,
coaches, promoters and the like seek to convey through their participation in the activity must be likely to be understood by the audience
57
watching the game. The particularized messages that games express
must, in other words, be not only intended, but intelligible.
This is in some respects a high bar, and in some respects a low
one. On the one hand, the fact that, under Spence, an expressive act
must be both intentional and intelligible excludes from constitutional protection many things that we may find entertaining or meaningful to watch but that are not the product of an expressive intention.
As Judge Posner noted in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, a display of
the northern lights might be both entertaining and personally meaningful to those who watch it, but under Spence it would not qualify as
constitutionally protected because it would not reflect the right kind
58
of expressive intent. Spence also fails to protect idiosyncratic expression that an audience is unlikely to understand, no matter how deep59
ly an individual may intend to convey it.
56
57
58

59

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
Id. at 415.
Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (“Anything that gives pleasure can be counted as entertainment, yet not everything
that gives pleasure is expressive. I might find a display of northern lights entertaining;
this would not make that display an expressive activity.”).
Hence the Second Circuit dismissed a First Amendment challenge to a county regulation
that prohibited van drivers from wearing skirts while on duty because it found that, even
if the plaintiff sought to communicate a “deeply held cultural value” by the wearing of a
skirt, this message was unlikely to be understood by those who saw her wearing it.
Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 318–20 (2d Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit dismissed, for similar reasons, a corrections officer’s challenge to a regulation that
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On the other hand, Spence establishes no limits on the kinds of
messages that expressive conduct may communicate. Nor does the
test restrict in any way the form in which these messages may be conveyed. Instead, as Robert Post argues, because the Spence test focuses
solely on the speaker’s intent, the message, and the likelihood that an
audience will understand that message, and pays no attention to the
social context in which the conduct takes place or the values that it
fosters, the test in principle extends free speech protection to acts
that, in practice, courts will be very unwilling to recognize as protected speech, given their preexisting commitments to the norms and
60
purposes of the First Amendment. Post cites as an example of this
phenomenon a racially motivated hate crime that successfully com61
municates a message of racial prejudice.
One can see hints of a similar phenomenon in the sports case law,
and specifically in courts’ unwillingness to even consider the possibility that the messages that surely all sports games send—namely, messages about the outcome and progress of the game—might be sufficient to entitle spectator sports to First Amendment protection. In
theory, it is difficult to understand why these messages do not satisfy
the two elements of the Spence test. The message, for example, that
“Team A won,” seems very directly a reflection of the arduous efforts
of Team A to communicate, by its performance in the game, this
message. It also seems unlikely that a clear and explicit message of
this sort would not be intelligible to the audience to the game. Yet,
courts refuse to extend protection to spectator sports on the basis of
messages of this kind. The Interactive Digital Software Ass’n court made
this clear when it acknowledged that video games might communicate to their audiences messages “[]related to the game itself”—that
is, messages that relate to the outcome and progress of the competi-

60

61

required him to wear a flag patch on his uniform. Since the court found it unlikely that
the flag patch would “relay any message (ideological or otherwise) to anyone,” the court
concluded that the regulation raised no issue of compelled speech. Troster v. Pa. State
Dep’t. of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995).
Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1995)
(pointing out that the Spence test’s flawed, limited focus on “a speaker’s intent, a specific
message, and an audience’s potential reception of that message” theoretically brings instances of defacement of public property under the protection of the First Amendment
even though no courts would permit such an outcome).
Id. (“Think of the racist who commits a violent crime successfully to communicate a message of racial prejudice and hate. In such a case we do not say that the state’s interest in
prohibiting violence outweighs the defendant’s interest in communication, but rather
that the First Amendment does not come into the case at all.” (internal citation omitted)).
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tion—but nevertheless denied that sport constitutes a “form of ex62
pression entitled to free speech protection.”
This refusal to entertain the possibility that messages of this sort
are sufficient to trigger First Amendment protection may reflect
courts’ commitment to their conception of the normative values of
the First Amendment. As Part III explores, the First Amendment has
traditionally been interpreted to protect, above all, speech on matters
of public concern—that is, speech that relates, in some fashion, to
questions of social or political order or meaning. Messages that relate solely to the outcome or progress of a formal contest like a game
may simply be too far removed from this core concern to justify constitutional protection. Even if we take into account this limitation,
however, and consider as grounds for extending First Amendment
protection to sport only messages that relate in some fashion to the
larger concerns of the social and political world, what the social scientific sports literature makes abundantly clear is that even nonaesthetic sports satisfy both Spence’s intent and intelligibility requirements.
A. The Expressive Intent of Athletes and Others
First, it is not true, as the Interactive Software Digital Ass’n court assumed, that because athletes are motivated to take part in games of
spectator sports by the non-expressive desire to win they are not also
motivated by other, more properly expressive desires. In fact, there is
considerable evidence that athletes take part in public competition
not only because they want to win but also because they want to show
that they can win. Sports journalism is replete, for example, with instances of athletes vowing to put on a good show or to show what they
63
can do. Indeed, like the professional entertainers to whom they are
frequently compared, professional athletes can earn tremendous
fame and money by putting on a good show. Michael Jordan’s exceptional performances on the basketball court, for example, “not only
transformed the game of basketball” but also turned Jordan into a

62
63

Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D.
Mo. 2002).
See, e.g., Rick Maese, Donte Stallworth: ‘I just want to show what I can do’ with Redskins,
WASHINGTON POST SPORTS INSIDER BLOG (July 27, 2011, 10:37 AM ET),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/football-insider/post/donte-stallworth-i-justwant-to-show-what-i-can-do-with-redskins/2011/07/27/gIQA1CjrcI_blog.html; Ian Thomsen, 1 Cleveland Cavaliers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 26, 2009, at 80 (Anthony Parker stating that “[he] was given an opportunity to show what [he] can do” in the NBA).
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“global superstar, celebrity figure and commercial brand.” Other
sports stars earn tens of millions of dollars each year in salary and endorsement deals; like actors and other kinds of entertainers, their
skill as performers can make them not only extremely rich but fa65
mous on an almost global scale. In this respect, athletes are like
other kinds of performing artists, whose career success depends upon
the excitement and interest they generate by their performance.
Athletes take part in spectator sports not only for fame, but also
for glory. The link between athletic performance and glory is an old
and well-established one. In ancient Greece, for example, participation in public athletics was considered a “deadly serious [means] to
66
attract glory to one’s name and honour to oneself and family” and
67
to “establish social status and individual preeminence . . . .]” Athletes did so by showing “especial skill and excellence” on the playing
field, thereby demonstrating the manly virtues associated with both
68
sport and war. Notwithstanding the significant differences between
contemporary and ancient athletics and contemporary United States
and ancient Greece, the sports literature suggests that athletes continue to take part in public athletic competition for glory. In other
words, they want to demonstrate to an audience their “especial skill
and excellence” on the playing field—and the moral (and often still,
“manly”) virtues it takes to acquire and to perform those skills—and
in so doing earn the praise, honor, and validation of those who watch
them play.
Sport provides an excellent venue for the demonstration of these
virtues because of its formalism. The simplicity and transparency of
the rules that govern athletic competition, and the fact that when individuals compete on the playing field, they do so from a position of
equality, lends games an appearance of fairness that may be missing
from ordinary social life, where individuals compete armed with highly unequal materials and social resources and according to a complex, and in many cases, highly ambiguous, set of rules. It also creates the impression that athletic victory is a consequence of the skill
of the players—and the skill of the players alone. It is because, as Mi64
65

66
67
68

BARRY SMART, THE SPORT STAR: MODERN SPORT AND THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF
SPORTING CELEBRITY 10 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 78 (noting Tiger Woods’s forty million dollar endorsement contract with Nike and
LeBron James’s ninety million dollar sponsorship contract with Nike, among others); id.
at 144–90 (discussing the cultural phenomenon of the global sports star as represented in
the figures of David Beckham and Anna Kournikova).
MIKE MCNAMEE, SPORTS, VIRTUES AND VICES: MORALITY PLAYS 16 (2008).
DONALD G. KYLE, SPORT AND SPECTACLE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 7 (2007).
Id.
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chael Mandelbaum puts it, “[e]very game begins with the teams equal
on the dimension that matters most: The score is always zero to zero.
The outcome of each game [appears to] depend . . . entirely on what
the players do during the contest[,]” so “sports . . . express the prin69
ciple of merit.”
In practice, of course, sports games do not provide as even of a
playing field as they appear. Economic inequalities impact which
players and which teams win the games, and racial and gender inequalities have in the past, and continue to some degree today, to bar
70
certain kinds of individuals from the field. Nevertheless, the idea
that what is displayed on the field of athletic competition is individual
excellence, freed from social and political constraints and inequalities, continues to attract athletes to sports. Indeed, sociological studies of athletes in a variety of sports suggest that one of the most important reasons why individuals choose to take part in public
competition is because of the opportunity it gives them to demonstrate that they possess the physical and psychological virtues associated with success in that sport.
In a recent study of professional prizefighters on the South Side of
Chicago, the sociologist Loïc Wacquant noted, for example, that one
of the primary reasons the men he studied chose the physically dangerous and financially uncertain profession of prizefighting was because of the opportunity it gave them to “publicly establish . . . [their]
71
fortitude and valor.”
By boxing well, fighters demonstrated that
they possessed the “virile values” commonly associated with success in
72
boxing, “such as hardness, pugnacity, and physical bravery.” At the
same time, by appearing fit and well-prepared for their fights, boxers
showed that they possessed the self-discipline and commitment that it

69

70

71
72

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE MEANING OF SPORTS: WHY AMERICANS WATCH BASEBALL,
FOOTBALL, AND BASKETBALL AND WHAT THEY SEE WHEN THEY DO 20–21 (2004).
Mandelbaum makes this claim specifically about team sports, but the same is true of individual sports as well.
For more discussion of these points, see D. Stanley Eitzen, Upward Mobility Through Sport?
The Myths and Realities, in SPORT IN CONTEMP. SOC’Y 249, 249 (D. Stanley Eitzen ed., 7th
ed. 2005) (noting that “[t]ypically, Americans believe that sport is a path to upward mobility” but questioning the truth of this assumption); JOHN HOBERMAN, DARWIN’S
ATHLETES: HOW SPORT HAS DAMAGED BLACK AMERICA AND PRESERVED THE MYTH OF RACE
(1997) (critiquing the myth of sport as a space of equal opportunity and a mechanism for
racial integration); Robert E. Washington and David Karen, Sport and Society, 27 ANN. REV.
SOCIOL. 187 (2001) (reviewing the literature exploring the racial, gender, and class inequities involved in professional sports).
Loïc J. D. Wacquant, The Pugilistic Point of View: How Boxers Think and Feel about Their
Trade, 24 THEORY & SOC’Y 489, 513 (1995).
Id. at 505.

1130

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:4

took to stick to the arduous training regimen and ascetic lifestyle that
73
success as a boxer was believed to require. They boxed, in other
words, for expressive reasons: because they wanted to demonstrate to
the watching crowd that they were “m[e]n of strength” as well as
74
“m[e]n of virtue” and thereby earn its admiration and respect.
Studies of athletes in other sports suggest they also participate in
public competition in order to demonstrate their virtue and their
valor. In an article examining the phenomenon of pickup or
“schoolyard” basketball, Jeff Greenfield noted, for example, that
many kids in the inner city played basketball because it provided
them a perhaps unique opportunity to demonstrate, both to the other players and to those who might watch the game, their manliness
and value:
For many young men in the slums . . . the school yard is the only place
they can feel true pride in what they do, where can move free of inhibitions and where they can, by being spectacular, rise for a moment against
the drabness and anonymity of their lives. Thus, when a player develops
extraordinary ‘school yard’ moves and shots . . . [they] become his measure as a man. So the moves that begin as tactics for scoring soon become
calling cards. You don’t just lay the ball in for an uncontested basket;
you take the ball in both hands, leap as high as you can and slam the ball
through the hoop. When you jump in the air, fake a shot, bring the ball
back to your body, and throw up a shot, all without coming back down,
75
you have proven your worth in uncontestable fashion.

Subsequent studies have found that basketball players who play
the game in more formal arenas similarly compete to demonstrate
their manliness by demonstrating on the court, particular gendered
virtues, such as aggression, creativity, and physical strength. Hence, a
recent study of African-American college basketball players found
that they considered the basketball court a prime location in which to
76
“flaunt their manhood” by demonstrating that they had game.

73

74
75
76

Id. at 513 (noting “the homology set up in and by the ring between physical excellence
and moral standing,” its dependence on the idea that success in the ring “hinges on the
adoption of proper personal habits and conduct outside of it,” and that it was widely believed among boxers that “an ordinary boxer who conscientiously abides by the commandments of the pugilistic catechism, as they apply in particular to nutrition, social life,
and sexual activity, stands every chance of toppling a more talented but dissipated
foe . . . .”)
Id.
Jeff Greenfield, The Black and White Truth About Basketball, in SIGNIFYIN(G), SANCTIFYIN’,
AND SLAM DUNKING 375 (Gena Caponi ed., 1999) (citation omitted).
Shaun R. Harper, The Measure of a Man: Conceptualizations of Masculinity Among HighAchieving African American Male College Students, 48 BERKELEY J. SOCIOLOGY 89, 97–98
(2004).
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A recent study of middle-class practitioners of the sport of mixed
martial arts (“MMA”) found that these athletes also participated in
public fights because they wished to demonstrate their mental and
77
physical virtues. By remaining “steady in the face of [the] sudden
pressure [of the fight],” the researchers noted, “fighters show themselves and their peers who they really are by reaffirming collectively
recognized virtues such as gameness, heart, courage, and asceti78
cism.” It was because of the opportunity it provided to demonstrate
these valued qualities that fighters believed cage fighting accomplished things that no amount of training could. As the researchers
note, “Fighters believe training in the gym is about becoming the
sort of person you want to be, and fighting in front of an audience is
about revealing who you are and who you have become, both to your79
self and to everyone watching.” A survey of professional, college,
and amateur male athletes in a wide variety of sports similarly concluded that, for many of the athletes surveyed, their performance on
the sports field, and the relationship they established with the crowd
during the game, was “the most emotionally salient relationship
through which their positional identities [were] constructed and af80
firmed.” In other words, for these athletes also, it was on the playing
field that they showed who they were and what they were made of.
It is not the case, therefore, that because athletes play games to
win them, they are not motivated by other, more properly expressive
ends. What the studies quoted above suggest, in fact, is that it may be
difficult in many cases to distinguish an athlete’s competitive motivations from his or her expressive desires: that athletes play spectator
sports because they want to demonstrate by winning, or at least by
struggling valiantly to win, that they possess the particular physical
and psychological virtues associated with success in that sport and
that they thereby deserve the audience’s admiration and respect, its
honor, and its glory.
Nor is it only athletes who seek to communicate particularized
messages through their participation in spectator sports. Those who
fund and promote spectator sports also do so, in many cases, for expressive ends. National governments, for example, provide both
economic and non-economic support to local teams or sports pro77
78
79
80

Corey M. Abramson & Darren Modzelewski, Caged Morality: Moral Worlds, Subculture, and
Stratification Among Middle-Class Cage-Fighters, 34 QUALITATIVE SOCIOL. 143, 165–66 (2011).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 166.
MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY: SPORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF MASCULINITY 50
(1992).
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grams to ensure that when athletes compete in international competitions, they demonstrate through their performance the strength
and power of the political community they represent or with whom
they are associated. As James Frey and Stanley Eitzen note, “[S]tatus
in the community of nations is ultimately related to success in athletic
events. The gold medal count in the Olympics is important precisely
because that count becomes a measure of political legitimacy, of
81
modernization, or of a people’s resolve.” Municipal governments
support local teams for many of the same reasons. Michael Danielson
notes, for example, that in the United States, “[a]lmost every stadium
and most arenas built over the past half century have been financed
with public funds; and these facilities have been offered to teams un82
der ever more favorable terms.”
Governments support local
teams—and provide generous financial incentives to ensure they stay
local—because of the boost not only to tourism and tax revenues but
also to the city’s image and sense of well-being, associated with a suc83
cessful local sports franchise. This is an expressive desire—albeit a
risky one. Danielson notes, for example, that “Cleveland’s image as a
failed city was reinforced by a long string of losing seasons by the Indians, who played in a dingy stadium tabbed the ‘mistake by the
84
lake.’”
Corporations also fund teams, athletes, and/or stadia for expressive reasons: namely, because they wish to associate their brand with
85
the positive virtues displayed on the field during the game. When
athletes take to the field, it is not merely their own expressive intent
that they communicate via their performance but that of the governments, corporations, or other groups that fund and promote

81
82
83
84
85

James H. Frey & D. Stanley Eitzen, Sport and Society, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 503, 512 (1991)
(internal citations omitted).
MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN
METROPOLIS 14 (1997).
Id. at 7–11, 105–12 (exploring the symbolic importance of teams to the cities they represent and discussing the economic and social benefits to cities of having home teams).
Id. at 104.
See Matthew P. McAllister, College Bowl Sponsorship and the Increased Commercialization of Amateur Sports, 15 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 357, 360 (1998) (exploring the impact of the
increasing corporate sponsorship of amateur sports and arguing that corporations seek to
sponsor sports competitions in order to associate themselves with the relatively “risk-free,
apolitical message of struggle and triumph” sporting events communicate); SMART, supra
note 64, at 17, 65–102 (noting the increasing commercialization of spectator sports and
the powerful impact of corporate sponsorship on the cultural significance of spectator
sports); SPORT AND CORPORATE NATIONALISMS (Michael L. Silk, David L. Andrews & C.L.
Cole eds., 2005) (exploring how corporations seek to identify themselves with the nationalist messages that games promote).
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them—and whose symbols they often wear on their clothing as they
play.
Even those who regulate sports demonstrate an expressive interest
in the messages that games communicate. The recent decision by the
National Football League (“NFL”) to ban what it called “excessive
[touchdown] celebrations,” for example, was prompted by a concern
that the touchdown celebrations communicated the wrong message—and specifically, celebrated macho individualism, rather than
the teamwork and good sportsmanship that the NFL wished to pro86
mote instead. Efforts by both the NFL and the National Basketball
Association (“NBA”) to enforce a strict on-court and on-field dress
code similarly reflect the organizations’ concern that athletes were
sending the wrong messages by playing the game in the way they
87
These attempts to influence the messages that games comdid.
municate by changing the rules are only the latest in a long series of
attempts by the NFL, NBA, and other professional sports leagues to
shape the expressive meaning of their sports in order to ensure their
88
leagues’ profitability and respectability.
Rather than the product of a singular expressive intent, the sociological literature reveals sports games to be instead the product of
multiple—sometimes conflicting—expressive desires on the part of
those who play, those who promote, those who fund, and those who
regulate the sports. This in turn points to the cultural and sometimes
overtly political significance that games of spectator sports can possess. It is because of the symbolic power of what takes place on the
playing field that governments, corporations, leagues, as well as players, care so much about what happens during the game.

86

87

88

Phillip Lamarr Cunningham, “Please Don’t Fine Me Again!!!!!”: Black Athletic Defiance in the
NBA and NFL, 33 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 39, 45 (2009) (discussing the NFL’s decision to
penalize athletes and their teams for “ ‘excessive celebrations’ after touchdowns”).
Id. at 41–43 (arguing that what motivated the new dress code was an anxiety, by primarily
white owners, about black players’ adoption of “hip-hop” and “gang” dress styles, which
they feared sent messages of criminality and disrespect for the law which threatened the
respectability of both sports). Cunningham also notes the significant resistance on the
part of many athletes to obeying these rules. Id. at 39–40.
See, e.g., MICHAEL ORIARD, READING FOOTBALL 25–56 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1993) (exploring how early football regulators altered the rules of the sport in order to attract
spectators and to make the game more exciting by emphasizing the achievements of individual players—and noting the resistance this generated amongst those committed to a
more collectivist conception of football); Greg Downey, Producing Pain: Techniques and
Technologies in No-Holds-Barred Fighting, 37 SOC. STUD. SCI. 201, 213–16 (2007) (examining
how promoters of mixed martial arts structured contests in order to ensure a quick flow
of action, maintain audience excitement, and increase profitability).
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B. The Messages that Games Communicate
Just as it is not true that the only motivations that drive athletes to
participate in spectator sports is the competitive and non-expressive
desire to win, it is also not true that because games are competitions
they communicate no messages worthy of First Amendment protection. To the contrary, it is because they are competitions that games
of spectator sports provide a perhaps uniquely powerful medium for
communicating messages of virtue. This is because of the aura of authenticity that games possess as competitions. The fact that what audiences see when they watch a sports game is the genuine struggle of
the competitors to win, rather than a scripted simulacram of that
struggle, gives sport an aura of authenticity that narrative art, no matter how gripping, cannot match. This is not to say that narrative
art—Shakespeare’s plays, for example—does not provide audiences a
kind of psychological or artistic truth that sport does not. Nevertheless, the idea that what happens on the playing field is not only real
but also somehow true is an important source of sport’s appeal, both
to athletes and to spectators. As the football historian Michael Oriard
argues with respect to football, the fact that “behind the spectacle of
football, real persons are performing real acts” means that “football is
grounded in a reality absent from the popular romance or adventure
89
plot.” For this reason, Oriard argues against attempts to equate athletes to entertainers and to analogize sports like football to other
genres of mass entertainment. Instead, he argues that the reality of
sport provides the activity a specific kind of “cultural power” that art
cannot replicate: namely, the power “to tell [real] stories . . . in a way
90
that no movie or novel can.”
Other commentators have noted the peculiar cultural power that
sports, and those who play sports, possess because of the aura of authenticity that attaches to games and to those who participate in
them. Michael Mandelbaum argues, for example, that the fact that
“[a]ctors who appear to do dangerous, difficult things on the screen
almost never actually do them [whereas] . . . baseball, football, and
basketball players really do what spectators see them do” is one reason why athletes have historically been favored over actors as product
91
pitchmen. “Because the spectator could be confident of the authenticity of their deeds,” advertisers believed that consumers would more

89
90
91

ORIARD, supra note 88, at 9.
Id.
MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 11.
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willingly “believe in the sincerity of their words” when they promoted
92
a product.
The writer Joseph Epstein suggests, similarly, that a great part of
sports’ appeal to spectators is the authenticity which attaches to it:
the fact that what happens on the field is “beyond the aid of public
93
relations” and, for that reason, is “fraud-free and fakeproof.”
Sport may be the toy department of life, but one of its abiding compensations is that, at least on the field, it is the real thing. . . . With a full count,
two men on, his team down by one run in the last of the eighth, a batter
(as well as a pitcher) is beyond the aid of public relations. At match
point at Forest Hills a player’s press clippings are of no help. . . . In all
these situations, and hundreds of others, a man either comes through or
he doesn’t. He is alone out there, naked but for his ability, which counts
for everything. Something there is that is elemental about this, and
94
something greatly satisfying.

It is also because what happens on the field is real in this way that
spectator sports provide, as the sociologist Barry Smart notes, “one of
the most significant . . . institutional sites for popular cultural recognition and acclaim of exceptional performance and prowess, if not
the most prominent context in which the deeds of participants con95
tinue to retain authenticity.”
Nor is it simply athletes’ physical
prowess that audiences recognize and acclaim. This is demonstrated
by the fact that athletes tend to get celebrated as heroes and role
models, not just as celebrities. The difference between a celebrity
and a hero, of course, is the moral value that attaches to the latter but
not to the former. Whereas celebrities are individuals who are
96
“known for [their] well-knownness,” sports heroes are “individuals
who gain honor” through the “public display[of] their personal
prowess, moral character, and social worth in [a] competition evalu97
ated by their peers and the broader society.”

92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 16.
Joseph Epstein, Obsessed With Sport: On the Interpretation of a Fan’s Dreams, HARPER’S MAG.,
July 1976, at 71.
Id.
SMART, supra note 64, at 9.
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 57 (1961) (emphasis omitted).
MEDIASPORT 138 ((Lawrence A. Wenner, ed., 1998) (citing John W. Loy and Graham L.
Hesketh, THE AGON MOTIF: A PROLEGOMENON FOR THE STUDY OF AGONETIC BEHAVIOR, in
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF SPORT (Kalevi Olin ed., 1984)). See also
Gill Lines, Villians, Fools or Heroes? Sports Stars as Role Models for Young People, 20 LEISURE
STUD. 285, 285 (2001) (“The sporting hero has traditionally been perceived of as epitomizing social ideals and masculine virtues, and as embodying values that learnt on the
playing fields will readily transfer into everyday life.”).
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Of course, athletes frequently fail to live up to their status as heroes and role models—in part because the virtues that they display
when on the field are not necessarily easily translatable into everyday
98
life. Yet, the intense criticism leveled against athletes when they fail
in their personal lives to live up to their role model status only emphasizes the strength of the association between superior athletic performance and moral, as well as physical, excellence. We would not be
so disappointed in athletes when they fail to demonstrate exemplary
behavior off the field if we did not believe what they told us by their
performance on the field: namely, that they are not simply superior
physical specimens but they also embody the sporting virtues—
among these, “courage, . . . perseverance, assertiveness, generosi99
ty, . . . dependability, honesty, and character.”
For many of the same reasons that it provides a powerful medium
for the expression of messages of individual excellence and virtue,
spectator sports also provide an important vehicle for communicating
messages about political community. The strong association that
tends to be made between athletes and the towns, regions, or nations
where they live or on whose behalf they play means that what athletes
demonstrate by their performance in the game is not only their own
strength and valor but that of the political community with whom
they are metonymically identified. It is for this reason, of course, that
governments provide so much economic as well as non-economic
100
support to local teams and sports programs. By funding sport, they

98

99
100

See, e.g., Lines, supra note 97, at 285 (noting the contemporary construction of the sport
hero as “damaged”); STANLEY H. TEITLEBAUM, SPORTS HEROES, FALLEN IDOLS (2005) (discussing how the pressure to succeed and the sense of entitlement that comes with being a
sports icon create circumstances that are ripe for sports stars to make bad decisions and
lose everything).
MEDIASPORT 138 (Lawrence A. Wenner, ed., 1998) (citation omitted).
For an informative account of the expressive, and more specifically nationalist motivations behind early efforts to establish a U.S. Olympic team, see MARK DYRESON, MAKING
THE AMERICAN TEAM: SPORT, CULTURE, AND THE OLYMPIC EXPERIENCE (1998). Dyreson
notes that one of the primary objectives of those who promoted the development of the
Olympic program was a desire to demonstrate that “modern American civilization did indeed produce . . . the ‘strongest and boldest people.’” Id. at 59 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt). The desire to demonstrate, via the number of medals won at the Olympic Games,
the strength and power of the nation and its people remains a common theme in the
promotion of the U.S. Olympic team and is replicated by similarly nationalist efforts in
other countries. For a discussion of nationalism displayed by various countries through
participation in the Olympics and other international sporting events, see generally
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL SPORTS EVENTS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SPECTACLE IN
THE OLYMPICS AND THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP (Alan Tomlinson & Christopher Young
eds., 2006); ALAN BAIRNER, SPORT, NATIONALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION: EUROPEAN AND
NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (2001).
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also, in many cases, seek to promote a sense of national, or local,
identity.
Indeed, sport has long been used as a powerful vehicle of collective identification, be it at the local or national level. Games provide
an important vehicle for the expression of collective belonging
because they provide a shared object—the local team or player—
around which citizens can collectively identify. As the anthropologist
Joseph Adjaye notes
[S]ports provide a unique medium for articulating national sentiments in
a highly symbolic way. The sports arena makes more real the nation or
imagined community. It incites the national psyche as no other activity,
often acting as a surrogate for politics. . . . For third-world nations, in particular, sports often carries a special political function that goes beyond
national pride; it can evoke a deep national consciousness that superficially masks internal divisions and forge a façade of unity. Thus in countries where internal tensions exist, international sports can provide a
stimulant to apparent harmony, for throughout history, sports has been
employed not only as a tool in nation building, but also as a means of
101
transcending internal strife.

In the act of collectively cheering their team or athlete to victory,
fans experience, and reinforce, the ties that bind them to one anoth102
er. In so doing, as Adjaye notes, they make the “imagined community” of the nation—or the political community of the city or region
103
that the athletes represent—“more real.” For this reason, the geographer John Bale argues that “[s]port has become perhaps the main
medium of collective identification in an era when bonding is more
104
frequently a result of achievement.”
When athletes take to the
field, what they communicate is not only a message of individual or
even collective virtue and valor; what they communicate is something
about collective identity itself: about “what sort of identities consti-

101
102

103
104

Joseph K. Adjaye, Reimagining Sports: African Athletes, Defection, and Ambiguous Citizenship,
57 AFR. TODAY 26, 32–33 (2010).
Scholarship exploring spectator identification with teams is vast. For some good examples, see GARRY CRAWFORD, CONSUMING SPORT: FANS, SPORT AND CULTURE 53 (2004)
(noting the important role that sport spectatorship plays in “creat[ing a] sense of community and belonging” among fans); JOSEPH MAGUIRE, POWER AND GLOBAL SPORT:
ZONES OF PRESTIGE, EMULATION AND RESISTANCE 109 (2005) (arguing that “[s]port provides an important arena for the construction, maintenance and challenging of identities
and has the capacity to bind together individuals, local communities, nations and the
world–but also to fragment them”); NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL SPORTS EVENTS:
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SPECTACLE IN THE OLYMPICS AND THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP
(Alan Tomlinson & Christopher Young eds., 2006) (exploring how national identities
come to be constructed through international sport competitions).
Adjaye, supra note 101.
JOHN BALE, SPORTS GEOGRAPHY 14 (1989).
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tute our countries and nations and other people’s countries and na105
tions.”
Games also express other messages that may not be as expressly
intended by those who play, support, or fund spectator sports. Sports
philosophers point, for example, to the aesthetic messages that are
expressed by what we might call a “virtuous” or “courageous” performance. As the philosophers Teresa Lacerda and Stephen Mumford
note
A victory can seem beautiful or dramatic because of the maximum effort
and focus of the athlete, even though they have no desire to produce
beauty or drama. Sport’s aesthetic value derives frequently from situations where athletes are confronted by their limits, and their attempts to
surpass themselves is one of the most appreciated aspects of the sport. . . .
Examples come to mind of Bernard Hinault, finishing a stage of the Tour
de France with blood streaming down his face and of Gabriela AndersenSchiess, who entered the Los Angeles Olympic stadium at the end of the
1984 marathon staggering and struggling to finish the competition.
Such cases show the ability of sport to turn the ugly into the beautiful
106
and profound.

It is not only the spectacle of human beings in prime condition
performing skills that, in many cases, they have spent a lifetime acquiring and perfecting that makes sport beautiful to watch, Mumford
and Lacerda suggest here, although the grace and beauty of the per107
formance is one of the attractions that draws viewers to sport. The
aesthetic value, they suggest, also lies in sports’ ability to render the
human struggle against adversity visible, in stark tableau.
Athletes may not specifically mean to convey messages of beauty of
this kind. Indeed, the moments of intense effort to which Mumford
and Lacerda refer may in fact be moments where the athlete is insensible to the audience and lost, like an actor or a musician, in the flow
105
106
107

GARRY WHANNEL, CULTURE, POLITICS AND SPORT: BLOWING THE WHISTLE, REVISITED 170
(2008).
Teresa Lacerda & Stephen Mumford, The Genius in Art and in Sport: A Contribution to the
Investigation of Aesthetics of Sport, 37 J. PHIL. SPORT 182, 186 (2010).
See WANN ET AL., supra note15, at 34 (noting that one of the factors that leads individuals
to become sports fans is an appreciation of “the artistic beauty and grace of sport movements” and that “the aesthetic motive is not limited to fans of stylistic sports” such as figure skating or gymnastics but that fans of other sports “may also express a high level of
aesthetic motivation. For instance, football fans who remember Lynn Swann (a wide receiver for the Pittsburgh Steelers) often describe the artistic nature of his leaping catches.
Similarly, track and field fans often speak of the beauty and grace of such events as the
discus, pole vault, and hurdles.”); Garry J. Smith, The Noble Sports Fan, 12 J. SPORT & SOC.
ISSUES 54, 58 (1988) (“Comitted sport fans say that one of the reasons they follow sport is
that they are fascinated by the excellence, beauty, and creativity in an athlete’s performance. . . . Devotees will speak rapturously, years later, of great moments they witnessed:
a Gretzky goal, a Dr. J move, or a Nadia Comaneci perfect routine.”).
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of the performance. Nevertheless, the aesthetic messages that they
convey by their performance are hard to disentangle from the messages of virtue, character, and courage that athletes more selfconsciously intend. It is, after all, the bravery and determination that
the athlete displays that makes his or her performance beautiful even
when it is not pretty, graceful, or easy but instead blood-spattered and
arduous. These aesthetic messages therefore add complexity to what
it means for athletes to demonstrate, via public competition, their virtue, skill, and character.
Games communicate messages about individual identity as well. It
is because of the importance of spectator sports as a site for the
demonstration of individual excellence and achievement that what
happens on the playing field, and who populates it, can have a
powerful influence on popular conceptions of what kinds of persons
have value, and what values matter. Hence, feminists argue that the
male-dominated nature of the major spectator sports, and the violent
and aggressive virtues they celebrate, play a key role in the
articulation and reinforcement of a notion of “hegemonic
masculinity” that, they argue, harms both women and non-normative
108
men.
For the same reason, critics argue that modern spectator
sports play a powerful role in reproducing racial inequalities and
109
stereotypes. Others point, however, to the tremendous importance
that the entrance of female and minority athletes into the major
spectator sports has had on the struggle for racial and gender
equality, by reshaping the popular conception of what minorities and

108

109

R.W. Connell, An Iron Man: The Body and Some Contradictions of Hegemonic Masculinity, in
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 83, 94 (Michael
A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) (arguing that sports help construct a culturally
idealized form of masculine character that “connect[s] . . . masculinity to toughness and
competitiveness” and which she calls “hegemonic masculinity”); Marie Hardin et. al.,
‘Have You Got Game?’ Hegemonic Masculinity and Neo-Homophobia in U.S. Newspaper Sports
Columns, 2 COMM., CULTURE & CRITIQUE 182, 185 (2009) (“The most powerful institution
for ‘shoring up’ hegemonic masculinity in the United States has been the sports/media
complex. . . . [M]en who participate in sports that most exemplify the qualities of hegemonic masculinity are constructed as embodiments of the ideal.” (internal citation omitted)).
HOBERMAN, supra note 70 (arguing that the astronomical social mobility of many black
athletes, who represent, obviously, only a small percentage of the population, distort public perceptions of the opportunity structure for blacks, causing many whites to assume
that blacks no longer face discrimination); D. STANLEY EITZEN, FAIR AND FOUL: BEYOND
THE MYTHS AND PARADOXES OF SPORT 7 (1999) (exploring how sport promotes a perception of equal opportunity that occludes pervasive racial inequalities and noting that while
professional sports present an opportunity for social mobility, the odds of athletes ascending to professional leagues are slim).

1140

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:4

110

women can do or achieve. In either case, what is clear is that sport
provides a powerful medium for the expression and contestation of
dominant notions of gender, race, and sexuality. Of course, like the
aesthetic messages discussed earlier, athletes or others associated with
the game may not specifically intend to communicate messages of
111
this sort—although in some cases, they clearly do intend to.
Nevertheless, the fact that games frequently do communicate
messages of this sort only provides further evidence of the sometimes
profound cultural, even political, significance that spectator sport can
possess, not despite but because it is a competitive activity that is able
to communicate messages that are both densely symbolic and also
somehow true.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The political and cultural significance of what takes place on the
field during the games of spectator sports has obvious doctrinal and
philosophical implications.
A. Doctrinal Implications
Doctrinally, what it means is that spectator sports satisfy both elements of the Spence test for expressive conduct. As the first element
of the Spence test requires, games reflect the expressive desires of
those who play, fund, promote, or regulate sport to communicate via

110

111

Michael Eric Dyson, for example, argues that Michael Jordan’s success on the basketball
court made him a powerful symbol of “racial and cultural desires to fly beyond limits and
obstacles,” an embodiment of perhaps a post-racial America. Michael Eric Dyson, Be Like
Mike?: Michael Jordan and the Pedagogy of Desire, 7 CULTURAL STUD. 64, 71 (1993). Others
point to the importance that Jackie Robinson’s entrance into the major league held for
the struggle for racial equality in the United States. See, e.g., John Kelly, Integrating America: Jackie Robinson, Critical Events and Baseball Black and White, 22 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT
1011, 1012 (2005) (“Jackie Robinson was the first black American known by most of white
America. His were the struggles observed, understood and embraced. His campaign reoriented public culture and the body politic. Maybe.”); Charles E. Schumer, Foreword, in
JACKIE ROBINSON: RACE, SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM ix (Joseph Dorison & Joram
Warmund eds., 1995) (“On April 15, 1947, Jack Roosevelt Robinson changed America
forever.”).
A particularly famous example of an athlete who specifically intended to convey a message about gender by her participation in the game of a spectator sport is Billie Jean King
who, in 1973, took part in the a highly-publicized tennis match—entitled the “Battle of
the Sexes”—in order to demonstrate that women could not only compete against men,
but could triumph over them in competition. See Nancy E. Spencer, Reading Between the
Lines: A Discursive Analysis of the Billie Jean King vs. Bobby Riggs “Battle of the Sexes,” 17 SOC.
SPORT J. 386, 386 (2000) (describing Billie Jean King’s victory over Bobby Riggs in 1973
and classifying it as “perhaps the most important event in women’s tennis history”).
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their performance “particularized messages” of individual or collective virtue—and perhaps other messages as well (messages of national
pride, of racial equality, of beauty, etc.). As the second element of
the Spence test requires, these messages are intelligible. The conventionality of sport as a genre of performance makes it in fact an especially intelligible medium for the communication of symbolic messages when compared to highbrow genres of artistic performance,
which tend to favor the subversion or transformation of existing sym112
bolic conventions.
In spectator sports, in contrast to more elite
genres of entertainment, the performance works only if actors follow
the rules. Following the rules is, in fact, one of the virtues that sports
113
express and display.
This makes the messages that games express
particularly easy to understand—a fact that may, in turn, be one rea114
son for sports’ mass appeal.
There is thus no doctrinal justification for denying spectator
sports First Amendment protection. This conclusion is buttressed by
the 2011 decision, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, in which the
Supreme Court recognized video games as a form of expression enti115
tled to First Amendment protection. In recognizing video games as
First Amendment-protected expression, the Court expressly rejected
arguments—similar to those made by the Interactive Digital Software
Ass’n court—that because video games, like other kinds of games, are
“interactive” activities whose ending is not fixed in advance but determined by the actions of the players, they do not merit the constitutional protection afforded other, less-interactive, genres of expres116
sion, such as movies, books, and art.
Justice Antonin Scalia, who
wrote the majority opinion in Brown, acknowledged that the experi112

113

114

115
116

See ANDREAS HUYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE: MODERNISM, MASS CULTURE, Postmodernism 4-7 (1986) (chronicling the twentieth-century concept of the avant-garde and of
art as a challenge to existing convention).
See WILLIAM J. MORGAN, WHY SPORTS MORALLY MATTER 146 (2006) (“[I]n sports, it is crucial that everyone start from the proverbial same starting line, so that no one enjoys a leg
up on the competition. At the very least, this entails an impartial observance and application of the rules to ensure that similar cases are treated similarly.”).
MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 7–8 (“The modern age brought incoherence to the traditional forms of artistic expression. . . . The highest value of a work of art came to be regarded as originality; but what was original was also often obscure. . . . [Sports, in contrast,] offer entertainment to the masses, and a principal reason for this is that they are
supremely coherent. . . . At the end of each game, the spectators and the participants
know which side has won. While the news section of the daily newspaper may report the
baffling and the unintelligible, the sports section features succinct histories that everyone
can understand, with a clear-cut beginning, middle, and end.”).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“California correctly
acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.”).
Id. at 2737–38.
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ence of playing a video game is, as Justice Samuel Alito argued in dis117
sent, “different in ‘kind’” from the experience of reading a book.
He nevertheless rejected the claim that this difference was constitutionally significant. Since he found that “video games communicate
ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with
the virtual world),” Scalia concluded that video games were, “[l]ike
the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,” fully
118
protected by the First Amendment.
What was true of the video games in Brown is true of spectator
sports. Although most games of spectator sports lack some of the
“familiar literary devices” that Scalia highlighted in Brown, such as
music and dialogue, they clearly possess others. They provide, for
example, larger-than-life characters that audiences can adore or revile. In the movement from the beginning to the end of the performance, they also narrate a story—though a story whose meaning
might depend, to a great degree, upon which team one is rooting for.
The fact that the end of the game’s narrative is not known in advance, but depends upon what happens on the field during the performance—as is not true of most kinds of artistic performance, but is
true of video games—does not make sport necessarily any less expressive than other, less-interactive genres of entertainment, as Brown
makes clear. Instead, it only adds to the power and urgency of the
dramatic narrative of the game, and in some cases, also the season.
As Michael Mandelbaum argues
[S]ports offer a particularly compelling form of drama. The outcome of
a game, unlike that of a scripted drama, is unknown. Few people watch
the same play or motion picture repeatedly because after they have seen
it once they know the ending. The tension is gone. But tension suffuses
each and every game of baseball, football and basketball. Moreover, in
organized sports the tension carries beyond each individual game and
tends to increase over time. Each game is part of a designated sequence—a season—the goal of which is to produce a champion. . . . Suspense mounts because, as the end of the season approaches, games tend
to become more important to the determination of the champion. In
this way baseball, football and basketball resemble the oldest of literary
forms, the epic. Like the greatest of them, the Odyssey, the protagonist—in the case of sports, the team—encounters a series of challenges
119
that it must meet to achieve its ultimate goal.

117
118
119

Id. at 2737 n.4.
Id. at 2733.
MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 5.

Apr. 2014]

SPORT AS SPEECH

1143

Mandelbaum is not the only writer to compare spectator sports to
art. Indeed, comparisons to poetry, drama, and theatre abound. A.
Bartlett Giamatti, former commissioner of Major League Baseball,
described baseball as “a narrative, an epic of exile and return, a vast,
communal poem about separation, loss, and the hope for reunion”
120
and the “Romance Epic of homecoming America sings to itself.”
Saul Steinberg argues that “[b]aseball is an allegorical play about
America, a poetic, complex and subtle play of courage, fear, good
121
luck, mistakes, patience about fate and sober self-esteem. . . .” Joyce
Carol Oates writes that “[e]ach boxing match is a story—a unique
122
and highly condensed drama without words.”
In truth, sports games are only metaphorically similar to epic
dramas, poems, or ballets. They may possess many of the same dramatic and symbolic elements as these kinds of artistic performance,
but the fact that they are competitions means that they communicate
and express cultural meaning differently than does a drama, a poem,
or a play. The analogy with art arises, nonetheless, because of the
deeply expressive character of both art and spectator sports. What
theorists mean when they say sport is an epic drama, a poem, or a
play is that sports games convey, in a similarly dramatic and densely
symbolic form, important cultural themes or messages. For this reason, although sport may be “different in kind” than other kinds of
expression that the First Amendment protects, it is no less deserving
of protection under Spence than are movies, dance performances—or,
for that matter, video games.
B. Philosophical Implications
The cultural and political significance of what takes place during
the game of a spectator sport also means that there is no philosophical justification for denying protection to sports but extending it to
art and audience-oriented entertainment. By philosophical justification, I mean a justification grounded in the aims and purposes that
First Amendment doctrine is intended to advance.
A notion of constitutional purpose has traditionally played an important role in modern First Amendment jurisprudence. When Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis reimagined the First

120
121
122

A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME FOR PARADISE: AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 95
(1989).
ALBERT THEODORE POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 9 (2003); HAROLD ROSENBURG,
SAUL STEINBERG (1978).
JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 8 (1987).
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Amendment in the early twentieth century as a powerful justiciable
check on governmental power, they did so by turning away from the
rather restrictive notion of what it meant to abridge “the freedom of
123
speech” available at the Founding.
Since then, the Court has persistently refused to define the scope of First Amendment protection
124
with reference to the precise intentions of the Framers. However, it
has also refused to extend First Amendment protection to all activities that, in ordinary language, would constitute speech, or that we
125
might consider, in one way or another, to be expressive.
Instead,
the Court has tended to justify the doctrinal rules it has established to
distinguish protected speech from unprotected conduct in terms of
the broad purposes that the First Amendment was intended to serve.
Hence, in the famous early twentieth-century concurrences and dissents in which they laid out the framework of the modern doctrine,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis justified extending protection to even
politically unpopular speech as necessary to further the core purpose
of the First Amendment, which Holmes identified as the protection
of the “free trade in ideas,” and Brandeis identified instead as the
protection of democracy against “the occasional tyrannies of govern-

123

124

125

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815,
835 (2012) (“When the First Amendment was adopted in 1791, the standard legal
view . . . was that the guarantee of freedom of the press banned prior restraints on publication but did not prevent subsequent punishments for libel or seditious advocacy.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 n.3 (1992) (“[I]t seems clear
that during the founding period, much of what we now consider ‘speech’ was thought to
be unprotected, and speech could be regulated if it could be shown to cause injury or offense.”). See generally MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 7–9 (1991) (examining the basis of libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207–09 (1983) (describing the early twentiethcentury historical evolution of the meaning of “freedom of speech” and the invention of a
new libertarian tradition).
Sunstein, supra note 123, at 256 (“The current state of free speech in America owes a
great deal to extremely aggressive interpretations by the Supreme Court . . . . These decisions cannot be justified by reference to the original understanding of the First Amendment.”).
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (Although “it is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes[,] . . . such a kernel is
not sufficient [by itself] to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”). See also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773–84 (2004) (“That the
boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of
the word ‘speech’ is simply implausible. . . . [T]he speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every
part of our lives.”).
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126

ing majorities.” Several decades later, a majority of the Court again
invoked the democracy-promoting purpose of the First Amendment
to justify, among other things, the extension of free speech protection to labor picketing and the imposition of significant limits on the
127
government’s ability to prosecute libel.
Scholars have also invoked sometimes divergent conceptions of
the First Amendment’s purpose to explain, as well as to challenge,
128
the doctrinal rules.
Given what Robert Post has identified as the
over-expansiveness of the Spence test, it is conceivable that, even if
spectator sports satisfy the doctrinal test for expressive conduct, there
may be other, philosophical reasons for denying sport First Amendment protection—reasons that are not fully captured by the Spence
test but that nevertheless influence how courts interpret it. Yet, it is
very difficult to see what these reasons may be.
Certainly, if we consider the question of spectator sports’ First
Amendment status in light of the most commonly invoked of the
amendment’s purposes—namely, the protection and facilitation of
democracy in the United States—there is no justification for extending protection to art and entertainment and denying it to spectator
sports. This may seem a counterintuitive claim to make, given the, at
best, highly attenuated relationship between spectator sports and
democratic political processes and debates. Indeed, some scholars—
most notably, Robert Bork—have argued that, if the purpose of the
First Amendment is to protect democracy in the United States by protecting the free and open political debate necessary to sustain it, as

126
127

128

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, in order
to give First Amendment freedoms the “breathing space that they need to survive,” public
officials may not recover for defamation “relating to [their] official conduct unless [they]
prove that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) (concluding
that, because “[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of
labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” labor
picketing is entitled to First Amendment protection).
The literature analyzing and critiquing First Amendment doctrine from one or another
purposive perspective is extensive. For a good survey, see Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 145 (1989) (finding that “[a]rguments from democracy
have been said in a comparative study to be the ‘most influential . . . in the development
of twentieth-century free speech law’” and noting the importance of free speech to liberal
democracy); see also Schauer, supra note 125, at 1785–86 (critiquing the various purposive
accounts of First Amendment boundaries that have been proposed).
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129

many have argued that it is, then the only kind of speech to which
free speech protection should extend is speech that is “explicitly po130
litical.” On this view of what it means for the First Amendment to
safeguard democracy, the vast majority of works of art would not be
protected by the First Amendment—and neither would all spectator
sports.
The Supreme Court has, however, embraced a much broader
conception of what speech must be protected in order to ensure that
it is, as James Madison put it, the “People, not the Government,
131
[that] possess the absolute sovereignty.”
In Winters, the Supreme
Court recognized that true crime magazines, although not expressly
political, had the capacity to both educate and politicize their audience through their depiction of the social world and for that reason
132
Four years later, in
were entitled to First Amendment protection.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court found the same to be true of
motion pictures; since films have the capacity to “affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal
of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression,” the Court held that even non129

130

131
132

See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 128 and accompanying text; Post, supra note 60, at 1275
(“The most prominent and important form of social order for First Amendment jurisprudence is what I have elsewhere called ‘democracy.’ . . . [L]arge patches of core First
Amendment doctrine in fact express the normative aspirations of this specific kind of social order, which seeks to sustain the value of self-government by reconciling individual
and collective autonomy through the medium of public discourse.”); Martin H. Redish &
Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2009) (“Democracy could not exist, in any meaningful sense, absent a societal commitment to basic
notions of free expression, nor could free expression flourish in a society uncommitted to
democracy. It is therefore not surprising that among the most prominent and widely accepted theories of the First Amendment are those that explain the Free Speech Clause as
either a catalyst for or a protection of democracy itself.”).
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27–28
(1971) (“The category of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy or personnel, whether the governmental unit involved is executive, legislative, judicial or administrative. Explicitly political speech is speech about
how we are governed . . . .”). Bork notes that the category “includes a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering and propaganda” but “does not cover scientific, educational, commercial, or literary expression as such.” Id. at 28; see also Lillian R. BeVier, The
First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1978) (arguing that in principle, First Amendment protection
extends only to political speech, although acknowledging the possibility that in practice,
“pragmatic and institutional concerns” might justify the extension of First Amendment
protection to some kinds of art).
Sunstein, supra note 123, at 256 (quoting James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolution,
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)).
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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political movies were entitled to the same degree of constitutional
133
In the
protection as was afforded more explicitly political speech.
years since Joseph Burstyn, members of the Court have continued to
affirm that art and entertainment are entitled to the highest degree
of First Amendment protection because of their ability to express
134
and, in turn, shape public attitudes and beliefs. The Court has continued to recognize, in other words, that artistic expression must be
protected because of its capacity to influence, even if only indirectly,
democratic political debates by influencing how members of the polity understand and imagine the world around them.
Under this more capacious conception of what it means for the
First Amendment to safeguard democracy in the United States, there
is no justification for denying protection to spectator sports. This is
because, like movies and other kinds of audience-oriented entertainment, spectator sports have the capacity to “affect public attitudes
and behavior in a variety of ways,”—as the previous Part should already have made clear. By providing a forum for the demonstration
and valorization of individual virtue, games help shape ideas of what
virtues matter and who possesses them. They influence popular notions of gender, sexuality, and race. They reinforce, and make more
effectively powerful, collective identities, including national ones. By
providing a venue in which individuals appear to compete on a truly
even playing field, sports may also help to reinforce popular faith in
135
the meritocratic ideal so important to American democracy.
In
these ways, games of spectator sports help shape our conceptions of
the normative social order and, by implication, the rules that should
govern it. As such, games of spectator sports are political, or at least
politically relevant, in the same way that the Burstyn court recognized
133
134

135

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that because art has the potential to affect public attitudes and behavior in
various ways,, “[i]t goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First
Amendment protection” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501)).
See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 62, at 20–21 (noting that team sports in the United
States express the principle of merit and the democratic ideal that we all have to play by
the same rules); Gerald Early et. al., Baseball, Boxing and the Charisma of Sport and Race, in
The Charisma of Sport and Race, 8 DOREEN B. TOWNSEND CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERS 5
(Christina M. Gillis ed., 1996) (“Sport is about meritocracy. People are attracted to sport
often because it is pure meritocracy. You have to be excellent at sport, and that excellence supposedly transcends any social construction except the social construction of
‘athlete’ which, ideally, is just reified merit, actualized desire and ambition, or apolitical
excellence. Of course, sport has practiced race and gender exclusion, but in the rational
liberalism that sport represents, this exclusion has been seen as a form of corruption of
sport’s ‘truth.’”); Eitzen, supra note 70, at 249 (“Typically, Americans believe that sport is
a path to upward social mobility.”).
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movies could be, and later decisions recognized to be true of music,
drama, poetry, and dance as well.
Even if one accepts the narrower, Borkian view of what speech
must be protected in order to safeguard democracy in the United
States, there is little reason to believe that art should receive protection and spectator sports should not. Most art is, after all, not explicitly political, in the sense that Bork uses the term, to refer to “speech
136
concerned with governmental behavior, policy or personnel.” The
Borkian interpretation of what it means for the First Amendment to
safeguard democracy does not, therefore, justify the current doctrinal
arrangement any more than the more expansive interpretation
adopted by the Court in Winters and Joseph Burstyn does; nor does Cass
Sunstein’s recent effort to carve out a somewhat broader category of
political speech than that which Bork proposes. Sunstein defines the
category of speech he thinks must be protected in order to safeguard
democracy in the United States as “speech intended and received as a
137
contribution to public deliberation.”
In this category, he includes
some but not all art. Sunstein argues, for example, that Charles
Dicken’s novel Bleak House and the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe, should be considered political speech because, in both cases,
they engage, and were intended to engage, with pressing social issues
of their time (the exploitation of the worker, in the first case, and
138
questions of privacy and sexuality in the second case).
Sunstein’s
argument, therefore, would clearly extend protection to some art and
deny protection to some spectator sports that are intended to fulfill a
purely entertainment function. What Sunstein’s argument would not
do, however, is establish the kind of categorical distinction between
art and spectator sports that exists in the case law. Indeed, one could
easily argue that, under Sunstein’s definition of political speech, at
least some spectator sports should receive First Amendment protection. Billie Jean King’s battle against Bobby Riggs in the 1973 tennis
match, entitled the “Battle of the Sexes,” was, after all, clearly intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation, as was Jackie
139
Robinson’s participation in Major League Baseball.

136
137
138
139

Bork, supra note 130, at 27.
Sunstein, supra note 123, at 306.
Id. at 308 (“Both Ulysses and Bleak House are unquestionably political for First Amendment
purposes. The same is true of Robert Mapplethorpe’s work . . . .”).
Kelly, supra note 110, at 1018–23 (describing the extensive deliberation and planning involved in Jackie Robinson’s signing with the Brooklyn Dodgers and the explicitly political
terms in which both Robinson and others viewed his entrance into Major League Baseball); Spencer, supra note 111, at 393 (noting that King participated in the match because
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None of the conflicting views of what it means for the First
Amendment to protect democracy—and what speech must be protected in order to do so—thus justify the current doctrinal arrangement. Nor can the different status afforded spectator sports and art
in the case law be justified under the other purposes that jurists and
scholars invoke to justify or explain First Amendment doctrine. Neither sport nor art provide the kind of objective truth whose discovery
Justice Holmes, in Abrams v. United States, famously argued it was the
purpose of the First Amendment to foster, although both genres of
expression may provide their own kinds of truth—what we might call
aesthetic or psychological truth in the case of art, and what we could
140
call moral truth in the case of sports.
Were we to conceive the
search for truth fostered by the First Amendment as a search for subjective, rather than purely objective truth, both art and sport would
141
therefore have a plausible claim to protection.
It would, in other
words, be difficult to argue that art contributes in a more significant
way to the discovery of “subjective truth” than sport.
It is similarly unclear why art would receive protection under a
First Amendment conceived primarily as a guarantee of individual
liberty or autonomy, but sport would not. If “the significance of free
expression rests on the central human capacity to create and express
symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music, intended to communicate in determinate, complex, and subtle ways[,]”

140

141

she recognized the broader social implications of the match, especially on the fight for
gender equality and the role of women in sports).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search
for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential
argument supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.”); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 67-176 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (offering a classic
articulation of the “search for truth” rationale of freedom of speech).
See Greenawalt, supra note 128, at 132 (suggesting subjective truth as a plausible interpretation of the search for truth rationale). But see Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (1984) (“[I]f truth is to defeat falsity through robust debate in the marketplace, truth must be discoverable and susceptible of substantiation. If truth is not ascertainable or cannot be substantiated, the victory of truth in the
marketplace is but an unprovable axiom. In order to be discoverable, however, truth
must be an objective rather than a subjective, chosen concept.”).
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142

as David Richards argues that it does, then surely the values are fostered equally well when an athlete exercises these capacities on the
playing field rather than in the concert hall. Of course, one could
argue that sport provides a less “complex and subtle” vocabulary for
the exercise and development of human creativity, but here we enter
the thickets of subjective opinion. In fact, athletes are careful to emphasize the complexity and subtlety of their art in the face of pervasive assumptions that at least certain kinds of sports—combative
sports such as boxing, for example—involve nothing more than the
143
exercise of brute force. Sports fans also tend to celebrate the subtlety and complexity of the moves that great players demonstrate on
the playing field and the creativity they display in negotiating, and ul144
timately, transcending, the constraints of the game. The argument
that spectator sports do not deserve free speech protection thus
seems as difficult to make under a liberty or autonomy rationale as it
is to make under the democratic rationale of the First Amendment.
Indeed, it is hard to think of another genre of performance in which
the themes of individual autonomy and self-mastery are more pronounced than they are in sport.
Despite general agreement in the cases that sports are not a mode
of expression entitled to free speech protection, it thus turns out to
be just as difficult to justify the constitutional distinction between
spectator sports and art by reference to the aims and purposes of the
142
143

144

David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
See Wacquant, supra note 71, at 501 (“Fighters conceive of boxing not as a springboard for
aggression and an exercise in violence but as a skilled bodily trade, a competitive performance craft requiring sophisticated technical know-how and an abiding moral commitment that will enable them not only to improve their material lot but also, and more urgently, to construct a publicly recognized, heroic self.”). Scholars who have studied MMA note
a similar resistance among fighters to the idea that the sport only involves violence. See,
e.g., Abramson & Modzelewski, supra note 77, at 158, 160 (“When we looked at the ‘collective dispositions’ and espoused understandings of this activity, it became impossible to
sustain the argument that the subcultural world of the cage-fighter is about celebrating
and supporting violence. To the contrary, fighters downplay the violence and highlight
the difficulty, competition, strategy, and challenge of fighting, often referring to it as a
game of chess. As Mark, a 30-year-old man working in the entertainment industry, noted,
‘You have to set up all of your moves in advance. You can’t just play a move at a time; you
can’t say I’m just going to knock this guy out. . . . I think that it [MMA] is a chess match
and the guys that can set up those moves win.’” (internal citations omitted)).
Epstein, supra note 93 (noting that one of the great pleasures that sport provides is the
opportunity to watch “craft of a very high order, which is intrinsically interesting”); Smith,
supra note 107 , at 58 (“A splendid athletic performance rivals any great work of art; but,
unlike ‘a concert where the musician normally interprets the work of the composer, the
athlete is an innovator, responding to each situation as it comes along.’” (internal citation
omitted)).
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First Amendment as it is to justify the distinction doctrinally. At least,
it is difficult to justify the distinction if we accept what courts have
been loath to accept but that the social scientific literature suggests
we must accept—namely, that games are expressive acts, which viewers watch not just because they are exciting but because of what they
signify and represent. Moreover, although it is certainly possible to
justify the claim that First Amendment protection should extend to
only political speech—and therefore should include neither sport
nor art—there are good reasons to reject this argument, however
broadly or narrowly the category “political” is defined. As Sunstein
himself acknowledges, “[o]ften the deepest political challenges to the
existing order can be found in art, literature, music, or sexual expres145
sion.” Spectator sports also, as we have seen, provide an important
arena for challenging the existing social order and, more particularly,
dominant conventions of gender and race. For this reason, even if
athletes, unlike artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe, may not intend
146
for their performances to “contribute to public deliberation,” they
may in fact quite powerfully do so. For this reason, even if plausible
arguments can be made that spectator sports, like art, should receive
lesser protection than other forms of speech, it is difficult to justify the
categorical denial of First Amendment protection to either genre of
expression—at least it is if we believe, as Jack Balkin recently argued,
that “true democracy means allowing people not only to have a say
about who represents them in a legislature, or what laws are passed,
but also to have a say about the shape and growth of the culture that
147
they live in . . . .”
C. Pragmatic Implications
There are, in addition, no other, more pragmatic reasons to deny
First Amendment protection to spectator sports but to extend it to art
and other genres of audience-oriented entertainment. The recognition of spectator sports as speech would not, for example, threaten
the fundamental First Amendment distinction between speech and
conduct by allowing “an apparently limitless variety of conduct [to]
148
be labeled ‘speech.’”
This is a common concern in the expressive
conduct context when courts are frequently forced to wrestle with the

145
146
147
148

Sunstein, supra note 123, at 308.
Id. at 306.
Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2004).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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implications of extending First Amendment protection to conduct
that is not only non-linguistic—and therefore does not fit our conventional understanding of speech as “the communication . . . of
149
thoughts in spoken words” —but may also be conventional and
hence widespread. At least one court has suggested that fear of an
all-encompassing First Amendment—in which everything is protected, and hence nothing is protected—influenced its deliberations re150
garding the constitutional status of spectator sports.
This fear is unfounded. Just as extending First Amendment protection to dance performances does not mean that all kinds of dance
are necessarily protected, extending First Amendment protection to
spectator sports would not mean that the First Amendment would be
151
“applicable to all athletic endeavors.”
Recreational sports would
remain unprotected—at least as a categorical matter. Of course,
there may be occasions in which recreational athletes, like recreational dancers, may be able to invoke the protections of the First
Amendment. Think, for example, of an anti-war protestor who jogs
around town wearing a sign that says something like, “End the War
Now.” His act would obviously receive protection for the same reason
that those of the schoolchildren in Tinker did: because, in the particular context in which it was performed, it both expressed and appeared likely to convey a “particularized message.” However, recreational athletics, like going to school, would not be categorically
presumed to be an expressive act. It is only spectator sports which
are entitled to categorical First Amendment protection for the same
reason that art and other forms of entertainment are: because, by
addressing a public audience, athletes participate in the formation of
democratic public attitudes and beliefs.
Nor should it be terribly difficult to distinguish recreational from
spectator sports. Spectator sports are sports that are intended to be
seen by an audience; to use Justice Daniel Souter’s language from his
Barnes concurrence, they are sports that are “directed to an actual or
152
hypothetical audience . . . .]”
While there may be some cases in
which it is difficult to determine whether a given athletic performance is or is not “directed at an actual or hypothetical audience”—
149
150

151
152

Speech Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/speech (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
Top Rank, Inc. v. Fla. State Boxing Comm’n, 837 So. 2d 496, 502 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (“I am in fact an enthusiastic sports fan, but I do not believe we should dilute the
significance of First Amendment protection by making it applicable to all athletic endeavors.”).
Id.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
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think for example of the pickup basketball games discussed in Part
II—in most cases, the distinction between recreational and spectator
sports should be relatively easy to draw. All sports whose performance fans or family members typically watch, either from the stands
or on their television, should be included in the category of spectator
sports. Activities that individuals engage in purely for pleasure or fitness should not. Although these acts obviously have expressive meaning for those who engage in them, they do not have the kind of expressive meaning that the First Amendment has historically privileged
and therefore, like the recreational ballroom dancing in Stanglin, are
not entitled to First Amendment protection in the absence of a showing of specific intent.
Recognizing spectator sports as an expressive activity would also
not impede the effective governmental regulation of the public
sphere—another worry that is frequently raised when questions of
153
expanding the category of speech occur. Governmental actors
would be able to regulate the time, place, and manner in which
games of spectator sports occur in just the same way as they currently
regulate the time, place and manner in which concerts, plays, and
154
dance performances take place. They could even ban a particularly
dangerous sport if the ban left open ample alternative channels for
the communication of that sport’s message and was genuinely di155
rected at the sport’s physical dangers.
They simply would not be
153

154

155

For a particularly forceful articulation of this concern, see Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2675 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To
apply a ‘heightened’ standard of review in such cases as a matter of course would risk
what then-Justice Rehnquist . . . described as a ‘retur[n] to the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York . . . in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic
regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate
means for the State to implement its considered policies.’” (citing Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (upholding a city regulation limiting the volume of amplified noise at a public concert band shell as a reasonable
regulation of the time, place, and manner in which public concerts took place on the
grounds that it was content neutral and “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest[:]” namely, protecting citizens from unwelcome noise); Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression, whether oral or written or
symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We
have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571 (upholding a ban on nude dancing on the grounds that “the requirement that the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys”); Clark, 486 U.S. at 294–95 (upholding a ban on sleeping
in national parks as a “defensible . . . time, place, or manner restriction” on expression
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able to ban the performance of a sport or the training necessary to
allow that performance, or otherwise target those who produce, promote, or take part in the sport, because of the messages that its performances convey. Under the principles that inform the contemporary view of the First Amendment, this would obviously be a good
thing. As Justice Brennan noted in Texas v. Johnson, “[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be156
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”
Although the sheer popularity of sports works as a kind of prophylactic against repression—after all, who would want to vote for the
politician who banned baseball?—spectator sports, like all other public sphere activities, are vulnerable to government censorship. Recent efforts in both the United Kingdom and the United States to
ban the sport of boxing, and the successful efforts of opponents of
mixed martial arts in the United States to get the sport banned in var157
ious states, demonstrate as much.
Serious health and safety concerns obviously played a role in the move to ban these sports, but so
too did concerns with both the violent and hyper-masculine messages
both sports were perceived to send. In the United Kingdom, for example, opponents of boxing compared the sport to pornography;
just as pornography, by valorizing the subjugation of women, depraves and corrupts those who consume it, so too, they argued, does
boxing, by valorizing violence and depraving and corrupting its
158
fans. Similar concerns with the effect of sports’ messages on its audiences informed the anti-MMA movement in the United States.
Sponsors of the bill to ban MMA in New York asserted, for example,
that the ban was justified because the sport of MMA was “disgraceful,
animalistic and disgusting” and “sets an abominable example for our
159
youth.”

156
157

158
159

given no evidence that the regulation targeted speech or attempted to ban sleeping altogether);.
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
For a discussion of the issues involved in the anti-boxing movement in the United States
and the United Kingdom, see Ken Jones, A Key Moral Issue: Should Boxing be Banned?, 4
CULTURE, SPORT, SOC’Y 63 (2001) (presenting safety, health, intentional harm, and violence-based arguments for banning boxing). For a discussion of the anti-MMA movement in the United States, see Geoff Varney, Fighting for Respect: MMA’s Struggle for Acceptance and How the Muhammad Ali Act Would Give it a Sporting Chance, 112 W. VA. L. REV.
269 (2009) (discussing the history of MMA in the United States and efforts to ban MMA).
Jones, supra note 157, at 69 (comparing and likening the harmful effects on citizens of
viewing pornography to watching boxing matches).
James Dao, Senate Chief in Albany, Reversing Himself, Says He Backs a Ban on Ultimate Fighting,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997 at B7.
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Whatever we may feel about either sport, arguments that they
should be banned—and in the United States, the successful enactment of such bans—premised, at least in part, on the dangerous, disgusting, or disgraceful messages that they communicate to their audiences clearly implicate a “bedrock principle” of First Amendment
concern. Yet, under the precedents outlined in Part I of this Article,
the First Amendment has no relevance to struggles over the status of
these sports, and the government retains its power, in this arena of
public life if no other, to act as a moral censor.
D. Indirect Benefits
Recognizing spectator sports as First Amendment-protected expression would therefore help safeguard an important sphere of cultural expression in the United States from governmental repression
and political control. It would have two other, more indirect, benefits as well.
First, it would help clarify what is at present the rather vexing case
law governing art and entertainment. In 1981, Justice Byron White
declared, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, that “[e]ntertainment,
as well as political and ideological speech, is protected [by the First
Amendment]; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works,
160
fall within the First Amendment guarantee.” The sports cases make
clear that this is not in fact true. Nonetheless, courts continue to assert that entertainment in general is protected by the First Amend161
162
ment, even as others note that, in fact, it is not.
The recognition of spectator sports as a constitutionally protected
activity would help clarify matters by bringing, for the first time, all
genres of audience-oriented entertainment under the First Amendment’s purview. Non-audience-oriented entertainment, such as gam160
161

162

452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 211 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[L]ive musical entertainment . . . is unquestionably speech and expression subject to the guarantees of the
First Amendment.” (quoting Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 2004)); Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that musical performances are entitled to First Amendment protection); Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia,
687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that
‘[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.’” (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)).
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[t]he
passage . . . from Schad cannot have been meant literally”).
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bling and recreational athletics, would remain outside the First
Amendment guarantee. Strictly speaking, therefore, Justice White’s
claim would still not be true—that is, if we define entertainment
broadly, to include all activities designed to provide participants
amusement and pleasure, rather than more narrowly, to refer only to
“amusement or diversion provided especially by performers” (as Mer163
riam-Webster, for example, defines the term).
Nonetheless, the distinction between audience-directed and other
forms of entertainment is, unlike the current distinction between athletic and artistic kinds of audience-directed entertainment acts, a justified one, well-grounded in the First Amendment’s traditional priorities and concerns, specifically its core concern with speech about
164
matters of “public concern.” While gambling and mountain-biking
are activities that take place in public, they are not activities that address themselves to a public audience. They do not, as a result, implicate the same First Amendment values as do audience-oriented
performances like plays, books, and, of course, spectator sports—all
of which, by addressing a public audience, function to communicate
and express matters of public concern.
Extending protection to spectator sports would therefore replace
what I have suggested is ultimately an arbitrary distinction between
different kinds of audience-oriented expressive acts (namely, artistic
versus athletic performances) with a distinction that instead recognizes the different kinds of social relationships and constitutional interests involved in practices that address a public audience, and
therefore have the power to broadly impact public attitudes and beliefs, and those that do not. Extending protection to all forms of audience-oriented entertainment would also finally expunge from the
doctrine the troubling distinction between “entertainment” and “information” that the Court rejected as a plausible basis for distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech over sixty years ago
and yet which courts continue to invoke to justify their conclusions

163
164

Entertainment Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam/webster.com/dictionary/entertainment (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (“We
have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is
speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”) (quoting First Na’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). See also
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (stating that speech on public issues occupies the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[Speech] concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
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that spectator sports do not constitute a form of expression worthy of
165
First Amendment protection.
In addition to the clarity it would help bring to the case law governing entertainment, recognizing spectator sports as an expressive
activity would clarify the doctrine in another way: by avoiding what
we might call the “media fetishism” that currently besets the sports
cases. As is true in other domains of the First Amendment, the sports
case law treats live performance very differently than it treats the
166
same performance when filmed or broadcasted. Under the precedents discussed in Part I, live athletic performance gets effectively no
protection. Yet, courts generally agree that the broadcast of a sport167
ing event is a fully protected expressive act.
From either an audience-centric or a speaker-centric view of the
First Amendment, however, there is little justification for treating the
act of turning on the video camera as a constitutionally significant
event when what is being filmed is itself an audience-oriented performance like a sports game. In other contexts, of course—where
what is recorded is not something that was intended or performed in
order to be seen—the act is constitutionally significant because what
it does, in effect, is transform a non-audience-directed act (the dis168
play of the northern lights, for example) into something that is addressed to an audience. This is not true, however, of the act of videotaping a football game because, in that case, an audience already
exists. As a result, the act of videotaping a football game may enable
more people to watch the game, thereby extending the size and
scope of its audience, but it does not transform the game into something that is directed at a public audience.

165
166

167

168

Supra note 36–36, and accompanying notes.
For an argument about the unjustifiable distinction the First Amendment case law makes
with respect to live and mediated performance, see Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 235 (2009) (pointing out that,
under current precedents, “sexual behavior caught on film has more speech protection
than when it is live”).
United States Satellite Broad. Co., Inc. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (E.D. Cal.
1999) (holding that sports broadcasters are entitled to First Amendment protection and
that the argument “that telecasts of boxing do not enjoy First Amendment protection because boxing is somehow ‘less valuable’ than other subjects, runs contrary to every principle of the Free Speech Clause itself”); TVKO v. Howland, 15 OTR 335 (Or. T.C. 2001)
(striking down a state tax law imposed solely on broadcasters of boxing matches on First
Amendment grounds).
See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that although a “display of northern lights [may be] entertaining[,] this
would not make that display an expressive activity” directed to an audience).
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Courts provide no justification for the distinction that the case law
169
draws between live and broadcast sport. Nor does the commentary.
An obvious explanation for the different treatment of live and mediated expression might be the special solicitude due to the press under the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Yet courts do not tend
to invoke the Press Clause in these decisions; and most observers sug170
gest it to be a largely dormant source of constitutional protection.
In fact, what courts’ solicitude to the broadcasting of sports may reflect is their recognition that at least the act of watching sports is a
constitutionally significant activity. But, if this is the case, why does
First Amendment protection extend only to those who watch sports
on television, rather than in person?
Extending free speech protection to spectator sports would therefore get rid of another doctrinal distinction—in this case, the distinction between live and mediatized representations of sports—that currently complicates the case law without appearing to further any of
the purposes of the First Amendment. It would ensure that it is not
only the expressive interests of those who broadcast sports or watch
sports on television that receive constitutional protection, but also the
expressive interests of those who play and promote sports, and those
who watch sports in person as well. More broadly, it would ensure
that First Amendment doctrine recognizes the expressive significance
of spectator sports as performance, no matter the form in which it is
performed or received. If the act of watching sport on television is
constitutionally protected, the act of watching sport in the stadium,
and of playing it, should be as well. To do otherwise is to ignore all
the expressive interests, other than those of the broadcasters, involved in the performance of a game of spectator sports.
CONCLUSION
Sports sociologists frequently complain about the lack of interest
that social scientists have historically demonstrated in the topic of

169

170

In fact, the only commentary I have been able to find that examines this question is a student note. See Joshua A. Stein, Note, Hitting Below the Belt: Florida’s Taxation of Pay-Per-View
Boxing Programming is a Content-Based Violation of the First Amendment, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 999,
1002 (2006) (arguing that boxing deserves First Amendment protection).
See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a
matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the
freedom of the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“[T]he Court has never explicitly
recognized that the Press Clause involves any significant content different from that provided to all individuals by the prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”).
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sport. Indeed, for many decades, the study of sport was a topic of only marginal interest in the social sciences. As the sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu noted in 1988, the sociology of sport faced “special difficul171
ties . . . scorned by sociologists, it is despised by sportspersons.”
Sport appeared too inconsequential an activity to warrant serious
study; something that was too divorced from the concerns of the everyday social world to matter. Indeed, sport comprises part of a
broader category of human activities that philosophers call generally
“play,” and that is defined by its separation from the everyday social
172
world.
It is this, perhaps, that has led to the widespread perception—a perception that courts clearly share—that sport is a merely
173
“trivial” activity, entertaining, perhaps, but unimportant.
And yet, as the extensive body of social scientific research that has
emerged over the two and a half decades since Bourdieu lamented
the plight of the sport sociologist demonstrates, it is in fact because of
its divorce from the everyday social world that sports provides such a
powerful vehicle for the expression of social ideals and values. By insulating participants from the complexity and inequality characteristic of the everyday social world, sports games provide an environment
in which what athletes demonstrate, and what audiences watch, is the
concentrated performance of individual skill, as revealed through the
competitive struggle to win. What this allows, in turn, is the expression, in a particularly powerful form, of messages about individual virtue, beauty, identity, and political community.
Social scientists’ recognition of the cultural and political significance of spectator sports has led, over the past two decades, to an explosion of research and writing devoted to the analysis of the practice
174
and the significance of sports in contemporary public culture.
There has not, however, been a similar reconceptualization of the
value of sport in the First Amendment case law. This Article has argued that, for some of the same reasons that led the Court recently to

171
172

173

174

Pierre Bourdieu, Program for a Sociology of Sport, 5 SOC. SPORT J. 153, 153 (1988).
The most famous definition of the category is that provided by Johan Huizinga in Homo
Ludens. Huizinga defines play as: “a ‘free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary life’ . . . It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be
gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according
to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.’” JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS 13 (1955).
See, e.g., Early, supra note 135, at 2–3 (“They thought sport was a trivial subject and not
worthy of scholarly attention. Many dismissed sport as a passive amusement or entertainment, which precluded its having any intellectual content.”).
For a good overview of only some of the recent scholarship on the topic, see Robert E.
Washington & David Karen, Sport and Society, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 187,(2001); Niko Besnier
& Susan Brownell, Sport, Modernity, and the Body, 41 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL. 443 (2012).
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recognize video games as speech, spectator sports should also be recognized as expressive acts, and those who play in them, fund them or
promote them as entitled to First Amendment protection for their
participation in the act. Indeed, to a more profound degree than
video games, spectator sports provide a powerful venue for the articulation, negotiation, and contestation of our popular attitudes and beliefs, including our attitudes and beliefs about that most central of
175
American preoccupations—competition itself.
Given the centrality of sport to American public culture, and the
centrality of the idea of competition to American culture and ideology, the dismissal and general neglect of the question of the First
Amendment status of sport is both unfortunate and unnecessary. It is
certainly not required by the doctrinal rules that today set the
boundaries of the First Amendment. Instead, as this Article has argued, denying First Amendment protection to spectator sports only
distorts the doctrine, by maintaining in it distinctions—between information and entertainment, between athletic and artistic expression, and between live and mediated representations of sports—that
have either been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court as a legitimate basis on which to distinguish between protect and unprotected
speech or simply do not promote any of the purposes that the First
Amendment is intended to advance. It is widely recognized that
America is a “sports-crazy” country. It is time for First Amendment
doctrine to also recognize the expressive significance of spectator
sports.

175

As Gerald Early has argued, “[s]port is how human beings perform the art and craft of
competition. . . . Trying to understand what sport is about is trying to understand what
winning and losing are all about.” Early, supra note 135, at 5.

